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Targeted Capture
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt*
This Article confronts one of the most difficult and contested questions in the debate about targeted
killing that has raged in academic and policy circles over the last decade. Suppose that, in wartime, the
target of a military strike may readily be neutralized through nonlethal means such as capture. Do the
attacking forces have an obligation to pursue that nonlethal alternative? The Article defends the duty to
employ less restrictive means (“LRM”) in wartime, and it advances several novel arguments in defense of
that obligation. In contrast to those who look to external restraints—such as those imposed by interna-
tional human rights law, U.S. constitutional law, or, indeed, the laws of war themselves—to check the
operation of military necessity, I argue that the most plausible LRM obligation exists as a limitation
embedded within the necessity principle itself. Indeed, the principle of military necessity supports not one,
but two, related LRM restraints. The first restraint—virtually ignored yet highly relevant to contempo-
rary debates—is a right reason requirement: it prohibits the killing of combatants for reasons unrelated to
the pursuit of military advantage. Specifically, the necessity principle does not permit a preference for lethal
force over capture when that preference is driven by considerations such as retributive justice, a desire to
avoid due process obligations relating to capture and trial, raising morale, and diplomatic sensitivities.
The second restraint—more familiar to the debate yet still deserving of further exploration—is objective in
nature. It demands that lethal force benefit from a cognizable expectation of military advantage. The
Article develops and defends these claims, engages both contrary and complementary viewpoints, and antic-
ipates objections.
Introduction
When is it permissible to kill another human being? Almost never, the
law tells us. The norm against murder is a bedrock moral principle and
exceptions are recognized only in strictly defined cases, most notably when
killing is necessary to the exercise of self-defense against an imminent and
unlawful threat of deadly force, or when law enforcement must use lethal
force to prevent a dangerous felon from escaping.1 These limitations are
* Professor, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. This Article benefited from presenta-
tions at the William & Mary Law School’s International Law Roundtable, the American Society of Inter-
national Law’s 2017 Annual Research Forum, and the Pace Law School faculty colloquium. I am grateful
to Nancy Combs, Evan Criddle, Kristina Daugirdas, Laura Dickinson, Mark Drumbl, Margaret DeGuz-
man, Anna Evangelidi, Jean Galbraith, Kent Greenawalt, Craig Martin, Jason Parkin, Leila Sadat, Yahli
Shereshevsky, and Adrien Wing for their insightful comments, and to Zach Berliner for his research
assistance.  Many thanks as well to Nathan Wolcott, Matthew Carrieri, Lisandra Novo, and the other
editors of the Harvard International Law Journal for their outstanding editorial work.
1. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a
dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 22 (1985) (holding that an officer’s use of lethal force without adequate physical
threat of harm was unconstitutional); Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1985) (stating
that the use of force is justifiable if “immediately necessary” to protect against an attack); Joshua
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 21.03, at 275–78 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing the rules
governing use of deadly force at common law).
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common to domestic legal systems and also find recognition in international
law.2
The conduct of wartime hostilities, however, opens up an entirely differ-
ent legal landscape, one that is far less protective of human life. Indeed, the
practice of war is so regrettably familiar that it can be easy to forget how
dramatically its operation deviates from the normal rules and intuitions gov-
erning the resort to lethal force. The international obligations regulating the
conduct of hostilities are known as International Humanitarian Law
(“IHL”).3 Yet despite the humanitarian aspirations reflected in this title, the
core of this law embraces a remarkable permission. Enemy soldiers are con-
stant targets of attack, whether they are bearing arms on the battlefield,
sleeping in their beds at night, or performing clerical duties in an office.
They are targeted by virtue of their status irrespective of the particular,
individual threat they may or may not present at any given moment.4 Civil-
ians receive greater, but nevertheless diminished, protection. While they
may not themselves be the object of attack, that protection does not prohibit
(within limits) the knowing taking of civilian life as loss incidental to an
attack directed against a military objective.5
Recent years have focused renewed attention on these rules as the conduct
of warfare has evolved in new, and sometimes troubling, directions as a con-
sequence of evolving global challenges and profound technological advances.
In particular, the United States government has invoked the permissive war-
2. See McCann & Others v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45–6, 64 (1995) (holding
that killing must be “absolutely necessary” to defend against unlawful violence, effect lawful arrest or
prevent escape, or quell a riot or insurrection).
3. The core international rules governing the conduct of hostilities are set forth in the 1977 First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Although the United States has not
ratified this treaty, it has embraced its rules as a matter of U.S. law. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Defense,
Law of War Manual (2015, updated Dec. 2016), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?
ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [hereinafter DOD, Law of War Manual]. Moreover, there is broad rec-
ognition that the Additional Protocol I rules reflect requirements of customary international law. See
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 57(6) PD 285, ¶ 4 (2005) (Isr.)
(Additional Protocol I “reflects the norms of customary international law, which obligate Israel”); Legal-
ity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 75 (July 8)
(noting that “[t]he provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977 give expression and attest to the unity
and complexity” of the “large number of customary rules [that] have been developed by the practice of
States”); id. ¶ 78 (summarizing “[t]he cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric
of humanitarian law”); see generally 1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Custom-
ary International Humanitarian Law: Rules (2005) (identifying rules of customary international
law that, to a large extent, parallel the requirements of Additional Protocol I).
4. See infra Part I.
5. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3) (specifying that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection R
afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”); id. art.
51(5)(b) (prohibiting “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”).
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time legal regime to justify its practice of targeted killing.6 In many cases,
including the 2011 killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, the United States has em-
ployed lethal force by way of unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”), or so-
called “drones.”7 By one estimate, drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia have claimed more than 4,000 lives since 2004.8 In
other cases, such as the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, the United States
has deployed special forces on the ground.9 In all these instances, the basic
legal theory is the same: the United States is at war with Al Qaeda and its
affiliates, and the targets are enemy belligerents in this conflict.10
The use of targeted killing since 9/11 has provoked debate on a range of
legal questions. Many of these have focused on the various triggering condi-
tions necessary to justify the use of armed force. Such questions include
whether a state of armed conflict exists between all of the groups against
which the United States has conducted strikes,11 whether existing armed
conflicts extend to all of the countries where the United States has con-
6. Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against Osama bin Laden, Opinio Juris
(May 19, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-against-osama-
bin-laden (justifying bin Laden’s killing under International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”)); Barack
Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University
(May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university (defending legality of drone strikes on the ground that “under domestic law, and
international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces”)
[hereinafter Obama, NDU Speech]; Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder
Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law (March 5, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-university-school-law (maintaining that “it is entirely
lawful—under both United States law and applicable law of war principles—to target specific senior
operational leaders of Al Qaeda and associated forces”); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the Att’y Gen. 29 (July 16, 2010)
[hereinafter OLC Memorandum], in N.Y. Times v. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014) (invok-
ing “fundamental law-of-war norms” to justify the targeting of Al-Aulaqi); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law-
fulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qa’ida or
an Associated Force (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper], https://fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal
.pdf.
7. See Mark Mazetti et al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to the Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1,
2011, at A1.
8. Get the Data: Drone Wars, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://v1.thebureauinvesti
gates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
9. See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on Osama bin Laden
(May 2, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-
osama-bin-laden.
10. See sources cited in supra note 6. R
11. The United States has claimed authority to conduct targeted killings based on the fact that it is
engaged in a non-international armed conflict against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated forces. See
sources cited in supra note 6. For a critical perspective, see, for example, Noam Lubell, Extraterrito- R
rial Use Of Force Against Non-State Actors 118 (2010) (“As for Al-Qaeda it is hard to conclude
that it currently possesses the characteristics of a party to a conflict.”); Kai Ambos & Josef Alkatout, Has
‘Justice Been Done’? The Legality of Bin Laden’s Killing Under International Law, 45 Isr. L. Rev. 341,
347–50 (2012) (arguing against the existence of an armed conflict with Al Qaeda on the ground that Al
Qaeda is insufficiently organized). For a defense of the United States’ position, see, for example, Jens
David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1282–87 (2013).
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ducted strikes,12 whether there are geographic limits to the laws of war that
prohibit targeted killings in places that are not “hot” battlefields,13 and
whether the intended victims of these strikes—including members of Al
Qaeda and affiliated groups—all properly qualify as military targets rather
than protected civilians.14 In different ways, each of these questions asks
whether the targets are the kind against whom the United States has the
right to use military force.
A separate and especially difficult debate, however, has focused on the
nature of the permission to kill belligerents when all of these status-based
requirements are met. Suppose that the target of a strike may readily be
neutralized through nonlethal means such as capture. Do the attacking
forces have an obligation to pursue this nonlethal option? Although there
are well-settled cases—such as surrender, incapacitation by wounds, and im-
permissible risks to civilian life—where the law clearly prohibits the killing
of enemy combatants, the primary legal sources do not explicitly impose a
12. On this point, a particular controversy has focused on whether the existence of armed conflict is
sufficient to justify strikes conducted against these groups on the territory of states which have not
consented to the strikes and with which the United States is not itself at war. See, e.g., Philip Alston
(Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Rep. on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter Alston Report],
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf (noting that
“[i]n the absence of consent, or in addition to it, States may invoke the right to self-defence as justifica-
tion for the extraterritorial use of force involving targeted killings . . . [c]ontroversy has arisen, however,
in three main areas: whether the self-defence justification applies to the use of force against non-state
actors and what constitutes an armed attack by such actors; the extent to which self-defence alone is a
justification for targeted killings; and, the extent to which States have a right to ‘anticipatory’ or ‘pre-
emptive’ self-defence.”); Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-
territorial Self-Defense, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 483, 499 (2012) (arguing that international law recognizes a
right of self-defense in response to attacks by non-state groups launched from within the territory of a
state that is “unable or unwilling” to suppress the threat itself); Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama
Bin Laden and Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 14 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 255, 265–82
(2012) (analyzing various possible justifications for killing of Osama bin Laden notwithstanding Paki-
stan’s apparent lack of consent to the operation).
13. See, e.g., Alston Report, supra note 12, ¶ 53 (concluding that it is “problematic for the US to show R
that—outside the context of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq—it is in a transnational non-
international armed conflict against ‘al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated forces’ without further
explanation of how those entities constitute a ‘party’ under the IHL of non-international armed conflict,
and whether and how any violence by any such group rises to the level necessary for an armed conflict to
exist” (footnote omitted)); Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 11, at 352 (disputing the applicability of IHL R
to the bin Laden killing on the ground that “the location where the killing took place (Abbottabad) is
not only situated outside a reasonable ‘spillover’ area . . . but also outside the actual Pakistan battle
zone”); Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding
the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 15–20 (2010); Jennifer C. Daskal, The
Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1165, 1176–92 (2013); John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. &
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law & Security: Strengthening our
Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Brennan Speech], http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adher-
ing-our-values-an (“The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida
as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.”).
14. See, e.g., Alston Report, supra note 12, ¶ 57 (noting that “[t]he greatest source of the lack of R
clarity with respected [sic] to targeted killings in the context of armed conflict is who qualifies as a
lawful target, and where and when the person may be targeted”).
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general obligation to choose capture over killing when feasible.15 Neverthe-
less, various authorities and commentators have argued that precisely such
an obligation to favor less restrictive means (“LRM”) does indeed govern the
conduct of hostilities. Several decades ago, esteemed IHL expert Jean Pictet
famously propounded that
[i]f we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we
should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by
wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to
achieve the same military advantage, we must choose the one
which causes the lesser evil.16
More recent support for this position finds expression in a 2005 opinion of
the Israeli Supreme Court governing Israel’s counterterrorism efforts in the
West Bank,17 and in a 2009 interpretive guidance issued by the Legal Advi-
sor to the International Committee of the Red Cross among other sources.18
The legal arguments in defense of LRM obligations have invoked various
sources including IHL, international human rights law (“IHRL”), and, in
cases where the United States has targeted its own citizens, constitutional
due process protections.
Each of these theories has met with fierce opposition. Critics of Pictet’s
approach argue that it misunderstands the structure of the laws of war.19
15. See infra Part I.
16. Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law 75–76
(1985).
17. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02, 57(6) PD 285,
¶¶ 18–23 (2005) (Isr.).
18. Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law
80–82 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance], http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc-002-0990.pdf; see also Alston Report, supra note 12, ¶ 76 (“Especially in the context of targeted R
killings of civilians who directly participate in hostilities, and given that IHL does not create an unre-
strained right to kill, the better approach is for State forces to minimize the use of lethal force to the
extent feasible in the circumstances.” (footnote omitted)); Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture
Enemy Combatants, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 819, 819–20 (2013) [hereinafter Goodman, Kill or Capture] (“The
modern law of armed conflict (LOAC) supports the following maxim: if enemy combatants can be put
out of action by capturing them, they should not be injured; if they can be put out of action by injury,
they should not be killed; and if they can be put out of action by light injury, grave injury should be
avoided.” (footnote omitted)); Ryan Goodman, The Lesser Evil: What the Obama Administration Isn’t Telling
You About Drones: The Standard Rule Is Capture, Not Kill, Slate (Feb. 19, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/the_obama_administration_and_drones_
the_rule_of_law_is_capture_not_kill.html [hereinafter Goodman, The Lesser Evil].
19. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule,
89 Int’l L. Stud. 536, 537–42 (2013); Jens David Ohlin, Recapturing the Concept of Necessity 4–7 (Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-90, 2013), [hereinafter Ohlin, Recapturing] https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230486; W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769, 796–97
(2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Goodman’s ‘The Power to Kill or Capture
Enemy Combatants,’ 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 855, 858–61 (2013); Shane R. Reeves & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Are
We Reaching a Tipping Point? How Contemporary Challenges Are Affecting the Military Necessity-Humanity
Balance, Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. Features 3–6 (2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
HNSJ-Necessity-Humanity-Balance_PDF-format1.pdf; Kevin Jon Heller, The Capture-or-Kill Debate #8:
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They invoke the longstanding principle of military necessity that authorizes
the use of lethal force against all enemy belligerents: for centuries combat-
ants have deployed lethal force on the battlefield without stopping to ask
whether each enemy soldier might be neutralized through less restrictive
means.20 These critics argue that no such requirement appears in the appli-
cable treaties and customs, and that imposing one would be dangerous, ex-
posing combatants to undue risk and compromising their ability to
effectively pursue military advantage.21
Notably, the legal justifications offered by the United States in support of
its targeted killing operations make no mention of a legal duty to choose
less harmful means in lieu of lethal force, and the Department of Defense’s
newly promulgated Law of War Manual squarely repudiates such an obliga-
tion.22 Nevertheless, since the fall of 2011, U.S. officials have expressed a
policy preference for choosing nonlethal force in counterterrorism operations
when feasible. However, it remains unclear what, if any, impact this policy
has had on actual targeted killing operations, or indeed, how much of that
policy the administration of President Donald J. Trump will preserve.23
So framed, the debate presents a relatively straightforward matter of legal
interpretation. Does IHL impose an LRM obligation or not? Answering this
question involves layers of complexity that may not immediately be appar-
Kevin Jon Heller Joins the Conversation, Lawfare (Mar. 4, 2013, 10:01 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
capture-or-kill-debate-8-kevin-heller-joins-conversation.
20. See Corn et al., supra note 19, at 624; Ohlin, supra note 11, at 1335; Parks, supra note 19, at 806. R
21. See Corn et al., supra note 19, at 537 (“Because hesitation in the midst of armed hostilities pro- R
duces unquestionable risk to friendly forces and erodes the good order and discipline essential to effective
execution of military operations, the goal of [weapons] training is to develop a genuine sense of combat
aggressiveness that is uncompromised by any such hesitation once an enemy target has been positively
identified.”); Parks, supra note 19, at 810–12. R
22. The manual notes that “[s]ome commentators have argued that military necessity should be inter-
preted so as to permit only what is actually necessary in prevailing circumstances, such as by requiring
commanders, if possible, to seek to capture or wound enemy combatants rather than to make them the
object of attack.” DOD, Law of War Manual, supra note 3, at 57 (emphasis omitted). But it counters R
that “[t]his interpretation . . . does not reflect customary international law or treaty law applicable to
DoD personnel.” Id.
23. See Brennan Speech, supra note 13 (“I want to be very clear—whenever it is possible to capture a R
suspected terrorist, it is the unqualified preference of the Administration to take custody of that individ-
ual so we can obtain information that is vital to the safety and security of the American people. This is
how our soldiers and counterterrorism professionals have been trained. It is reflected in our rules of
engagement. And it is the clear and unambiguous policy of this Administration.”); Obama, NDU
Speech, supra note 24 (“America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual
terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute.”); Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards
and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities, White House (May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/
05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism (“The policy of the
United States is not to use lethal force when it is feasible to capture a terrorist suspect, because capturing
a terrorist offers the best opportunity to gather meaningful intelligence and to mitigate and disrupt
terrorist plots.”). Recent reports indicate that the Trump administration is preparing to loosen some
Obama-era restrictions on targeted killings. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop
Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2017, at A1; Charlie Savage, Will
Congress Ever Limit the Forever-Expanding 9/11 War?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/10/28/us/politics/aumf-congress-niger.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0.
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ent. At its root, the debate highlights a tension between two basic values
that lie at the core of IHL. On the one hand, there is the bedrock value of
human life. The norm against murder is perhaps the most deep-seated legal
prohibition there is, and protection of that norm demands that justifications
for killing be treated with caution. On the other hand, there is the principle
of military necessity that establishes a broad tolerance for killing in war-
time.24 In many ways, the debate over LRM is one over how these two values
coexist, and what implications they have for the interpretation of IHL in
cases where the law is silent or fails to speak with sufficient clarity. The
problem of targeted killing provides an especially salient context for explor-
ing this issue because it focuses special attention on the evolving methods of
warfare, asking to what extent legal understanding must adapt to changing
functional requirements.
This Article defends the existence of a legal duty to refrain from unneces-
sary force when attacking belligerents in wartime, and it advances several
original arguments about the source, nature, and weight of that obligation.
In particular, I argue that this restraint on wartime killing lies at the core of
IHL: it is embedded in the principle of military necessity, which is the very
principle that justifies wartime killing in the first instance. My argument
proceeds from a straightforward premise. Since it is military necessity that
justifies killing in wartime, IHL provides no justification for militarily un-
necessary killings. Hence, the obligation to consider LRM is internal to the
necessity principle itself.
Some have attempted to locate an LRM obligation in other legal sources.
In its decision in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. the Government of
Israel (“Targeted Killing Case”), for instance, Israel’s Supreme Court relied on
international human rights principles.25 The fundamental trouble with that
argument is that the use of lethal force in wartime presents an acknowledged
exception to the usual rules on lethal force. If one believes that IHL is silent
or ambiguous with respect to LRM obligations, then it becomes plausible to
argue that an external source of law such as international human rights or
domestic constitutional principles may play a gap-filling role.26 But that
position is more difficult to maintain if one believes, as do opponents of
LRM obligations, that IHL affirmatively authorizes the killing of combat-
ants without consideration of LRM. Hence, these arguments from external
sources of law still demand interrogation of IHL itself.
24. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8
june 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 392–93 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I] (“The law of armed conflict is a
compromise based on a balance between military necessity, on the one hand, and the requirements of
humanity, on the other.”); id. at 399 (“Warfare entails a complete upheaval of values.”).
25. See infra notes 53–56, 60 and accompanying text. R
26. See, e.g., Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A
Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int’l L.J. 233, 289 (2003); David
Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16
Eur. J. Int’l L. 171, 201–04 (2005).
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Others have looked to specific prohibitions within IHL. A recent article
by Ryan Goodman argues powerfully that the 1977 First Additional Proto-
col to the Geneva Conventions introduced an LRM obligation through its
prohibition in Article 35(2) on methods of warfare whose nature it is to
cause “superfluous injury” and “unnecessary suffering.”27 This position
raises various interpretive questions such as the meaning of the word “in-
jury” (a focus of heated debate between Goodman and his critics) and the
phrase “methods of warfare.” Although I argue that the best reading of this
language does indeed support Goodman’s view, the more fundamental prob-
lem is that the prohibition applies only to actions that are “superfluous” or
“unnecessary.”28 Consequently, the most plausible reading of Article 35(2)
is that it only prohibits actions that fall outside the necessity principle in
the first place. Although that provision does, I argue, provide important
interpretive guidance regarding the scope of the necessity principle, it fails
to support a restriction of lethal force that is otherwise justified by military
necessity. Similar difficulties also accompany attempts to locate an LRM
obligation in Additional Protocol I’s hors de combat protections.29
In these respects, my argument exhibits a formal similarity with the posi-
tion advanced by opponents of LRM obligations. They do not argue, in so
many words, that IHL permits unnecessary killing. Rather, they maintain
that LRM obligations are incompatible with the broad understanding of
military necessity that has prevailed in the history of warfare.30 Pursuant to
this broad understanding, it would seem, all killings of combatants not pro-
hibited by one of several uncontroversial restrictions will satisfy the de-
mands of necessity. Yet, as I explore, there remain cases that even this broad
understanding of military necessity cannot cover. Indeed, the principle of
military necessity supports not one, but two, related types of LRM
restraints.
The first restraint arises when a combatant is killed for reasons subjec-
tively unrelated to the pursuit of military advantage. While military neces-
sity may authorize the broad use of lethal force against enemy belligerents it
does not authorize the use of such force for any reason whatsoever. Remarka-
bly, this point has gone virtually ignored in the literature, yet it has impor-
tant consequences for the debate. In particular, this restraint appears
immune to the type of practical objections routinely asserted by opponents
of LRM obligations. The common objection that LRM obligations will frus-
trate the effective pursuit of military necessity can hardly apply to killings
not motivated by military necessity in the first place. More specifically, I
argue that IHL does not permit a preference for lethal force over capture
when that preference is driven by such considerations as retributive justice, a
27. See Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 851–52. R
28. See infra Section II.A.
29. See infra Section II.B.
30. See infra Part IV.
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desire to avoid due process obligations relating to capture and trial, or rais-
ing morale. I also explore some complexities concerning whether diplomatic
sensitivities—a major factor in recent targeted killing operations—may jus-
tify killing in lieu of capture. More broadly, I argue that scholars and policy-
makers should dedicate greater attention to defining the boundaries of
permissible military rationale.
A second case arises when a decision to deploy lethal force benefits from
inadequate anticipated military advantage. The clearest example is when the
decision offers zero or negative anticipated advantage as compared to non-
lethal measures. This case is closely related to the first case because the ob-
jective lack of anticipated net advantage supplies powerful evidence that the
use of lethal force was not in fact motived by valid considerations of military
advantage in the first place. A more difficult question arises when the kill-
ing of a combatant may have some military benefit that is nevertheless too
insignificant to justify the use of lethal force. While I argue that the princi-
ple of military necessity should be understood to demand some de minimis
threshold of cognizable advantage, arguments for more robust protection—
though plausible—face greater challenges given the structure of IHL.
My argument proceeds in four parts. Part I situates the debate over LRM
within the structure of IHL and the principle of military necessity, and it
critically evaluates arguments that the conduct of hostilities is restrained by
an LRM obligation emanating from sources of law external to IHL, in par-
ticular international human rights law and U.S. constitutional law. Part II
examines arguments rooted in IHL’s specific prohibitions—namely those
governing the imposition of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury
and the treatment of hors de combat combatants. Part III elaborates my claim
that limits internal to military necessity preclude the killing of combatants
in cases involving inadequate reason and inadequate advantage. Part IV de-
fends and elaborates this position against various common objections.
I. The Permission to Kill in Wartime
As with much of the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”), the law governing
killing in wartime is defined by the split between so-called jus ad bellum
(the law governing the resort to armed force) and jus in bello (the law gov-
erning the conduct of hostilities). States violate jus ad bellum when they
resort to armed force without benefit of a legal justification such as self-
defense or authorization by the U.N. Security Council.31 Although rarely
31. See U.N. Charter, art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”); id. art. 42 (providing the U.N.
Security Council with authority to authorize the use of armed force “as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security”); id. art. 51 (upholding the “inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”).
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prosecuted, the international crime of aggression assigns individual criminal
responsibility to state leaders for culpable contributions to illegal uses of
force.32
While not the focus of my Article, these jus ad bellum obligations de-
serve particular mention because they represent one area in which the law
clearly does regulate the unnecessary killing of combatants: the lives of com-
batants wrongly drawn into armed conflict must surely be counted alongside
those of civilians when tallying the victims of aggression. The point applies
most evidently to the casualties suffered by the opposing forces who have
sacrificed their lives in the lawful self-defense of their states, but one can also
count among the victims the attacking soldiers who have become obligated
to fight for an illegal cause.
Considerations as to the causes of war disappear at the level of jus in bello,
where common rules of conduct apply to combatants on all sides.33 In the
words of Michael Walzer, “[t]he moral equality of the battlefield distin-
guishes combat from domestic crime.”34 Individual soldiers are not respon-
sible for the aggressive actions of their leaders, and combatant immunity
protects lawful participants in international armed conflicts from prosecu-
tion under both international and domestic law so long as they do not vio-
late the prohibitions established by IHL.35 Although international law
provides no corresponding prohibition on the domestic prosecution of par-
ticipants in non-international armed conflicts, such participation does not
violate IHL, and, indeed, the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva
32. See generally Sean D. Murphy, The Crime of Aggression at the ICC, in The Oxford Handbook on
the Use of Force 533 (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015). Following World War II, senior German and
Japanese leaders were prosecuted for crimes against peace before international criminal tribunals. No
successor tribunals have enjoyed jurisdiction over the crimes, although an amendment to give the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over aggression is currently pending approval by the Court’s
States Parties. See id. at 534; Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on
the Crime of Aggression art. 8 bis, June 11, 2010, __ U.N.T.S. __, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publica-
tion/UNTS/No%20Volume/38544/A-38544-08000002802a6182.pdf.
33. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, pmbl. (affirming that “this Protocol must be fully applied R
in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinc-
tion based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the
Parties to the conflict”).
34. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illus-
trations 128 (1977).
35. Pursuant to Article 87 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
“[p]risoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the Detaining Power
to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of the said Power
who have committed the same acts.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 87, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention]. Article 99 in
turn provides that “[n]o prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by
the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.”
Id. art. 99. As one U.S. court has noted, “[t]hese Articles, when read together, make clear that a belliger-
ent in a war cannot prosecute the soldiers of its foes for the soldiers’ lawful acts of war.” United States v.
Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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Conventions recommends in these cases “the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”36
A. Military Necessity
It is here that the principle of military necessity comes into focus. Nota-
bly this principle receives no explicit affirmation in the modern interna-
tional treaties governing the conduct of war. A reader of the most significant
twentieth-century treaty on the conduct of hostilities—1977’s First Addi-
tional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions—will find no general statement
defining the affirmative permission to kill in wartime.37 Instead, this per-
mission exists largely as a negative implication, one to be inferred from the
gaps between the express prohibitions that the treaty does elaborate. The
treaty provides that civilians “shall not be the object of attack,”38 while
providing a parallel protection only for a combatant who is “hors de com-
bat,” defined as one who “is in the power of an adverse [p]arty,” who
“clearly expresses an intention to surrender,” or who “has been rendered
unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and there-
fore is incapable of defending himself.”39 The Convention specifies that at-
tacks on objects must be limited to those objects that “make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a defi-
nite military advantage.”40 No parallel provision expressly qualifies the
circumstances under which combatants may be targeted.41 There is a prohi-
bition against attacks that produce excessive incidental harm to civilians and
civilian objects,42 but again, no express parallel requirement that combat-
ants’ lives be weighed against the military advantage gained by their de-
struction or injury.
Yet if the principle of military necessity exists primarily by implication
in Additional Protocol I, it receives more express affirmation in other
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
37. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3. The United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, R
and by its terms the treaty applies only to international armed conflicts between states, and not to non-
international armed conflicts between a state and non-state entity, or between non-state entities. Never-
theless, the treaty codifies core principles of IHL that are widely accepted as customary international law
applicable both to international and non-international armed conflicts. See sources cited in supra note 3 R
(on Additional Protocol I’s customary status).
38. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(2). R
39. Id. art. 41(1)–(2) (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. art. 52(2).
41. As discussed below, there is debate over whether such a requirement may lie in the Convention’s
rule forbidding the employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” Id. art. 35(2); see infra Part IV.
42. Id. art. 51(5)(b) (defining as indiscriminate attacks that “may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”).
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sources. There is, for instance, the seminal Lieber Code of 1863, which regu-
lated the Union forces in the American Civil War, and represents the first
modern codification of jus in bello.43 The Code explains that “[m]ilitary
necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the neces-
sity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war,”44
and, more critically, that “[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruc-
tion of life or limb of ‘armed’ enemies, and of other persons whose destruc-
tion is incidentally ‘unavoidable’ in the armed contests of the war.”45
Another oft-cited account appears in the judgment of the World War II-era
Hostages Case, decided by a U.S. military tribunal established in occupied
Germany.46 This formulation, echoed in various U.S. military regulations
including the Department of Defense’s recently promulgated Law of War
Manual, provides that “[m]ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to
the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the com-
plete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time,
life, and money.”47
As these formulations reveal, the concept of necessity that has prevailed in
military tradition differs markedly from the strict necessity required to jus-
tify deadly force under ordinary criminal law.48 It is instead one closer to
that endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1819 in an entirely different
context, when it considered Congress’s constitutional authority to pass legis-
lation “necessary and proper, for carrying into execution” the powers dele-
gated to the Federal Government.49 “To employ the means necessary to an
end,” reasoned the Court, “is generally understood as employing any means
calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single
43. See U.S. War Dep’t, Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field (General
Orders No. 100, prepared by Francis Lieber, L.L.D.) (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. On the history of
the Lieber Code, see generally John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American
History (2013).
44. Lieber Code, supra note 43, art. 14. R
45. Id. art. 15.
46. See United States v. List (The Hostages Case), XI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals 1230, 1253–54 (1948).
47. Id. at 1253. See DOD, Law of War Manual, supra note 3, at 52 (“Military necessity may be R
defined as the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and
efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”); see also U.S. War Dep’t, Rules of
Land Warfare ¶¶ 9–11 (1914) (“[A] belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any kind of
force which is necessary for the purpose of the war; that is, the complete submission of the enemy at the
earliest possible moment with the least expenditure of men and money. . . . Military necessity justifies a
resort to all measures which are indispensable for securing this object and which are not forbidden by the
modern laws and customs of war.”); U.S. Dep’t of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
¶ 4a (1940) (“[A] belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any kind of force to compel the
complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money.”); U.S.
Dep’t of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 3a (1956) (Change No. 1 1976)
(“[T]hat principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispen-
sable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”).
48. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. R
49. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (emphasis omitted).
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means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable.”50 The point
is not that deadly force must be the only available way to neutralize an
armed opponent, but instead that the opposing forces are free to use which-
ever level of force they deem to be appropriate to the pursuit of military
advantage.51 Hence, the principle of military necessity is widely understood
to justify the large-scale killing of enemy soldiers whether they are engaged
in combat on the battlefield or, as the case may be, asleep in their camps at
night.52
I return to necessity, and its possible limits, in Part IV of this Article,
where I argue that the most convincing source of an LRM obligation lies
within the internal limits of this principle. However, the breadth of the
necessity principle helps explain why much of the debate over the disputed
duty to capture has focused on the possibility that some additional source of
law provides a relevant exception to the general rule that combatants may be
killed in wartime. Particular attention has focused on the possibility of re-
straints imposed by an external source of law such as IHRL and, in the
context of the U.S. military, constitutional due process protections.
B. International Human Rights
The claim that IHRL “co-applies” with IHL to restrict the killing of
belligerents draws support from one important judicial precedent: the Israeli
Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in the Targeted Killing Case.53 The dispute
involved a challenge to the policy by which Israel’s security forces acted “to
kill members of terrorist organizations involved in the planning, launching,
or execution of terrorist attacks against Israel.”54 In defining when such ac-
tion was permissible, the Court ruled inter alia that “a civilian taking a
direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if
50. Id. at 413–14.
51. See Ohlin, supra note 11, at 1273 (“Military necessity, by itself, never meant what it means in R
other contexts: the only available option. Rather, as far back as Francis Lieber, the principle of military
necessity only required that the attack confer a bona fide military advantage.”).
52. See Walzer, supra note 34, at 138 (“The first principle of the war convention is that, once war has R
begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any time (unless they are wounded or captured).”); Gabriella
Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. Legal Analysis 115, 117 (2010) (noting that “[t]he existing
interpretation of the laws of war supports Walzer’s conclusion” that a soldier stripped naked and swim-
ming in the lake is a legitimate target during an armed conflict); Corn et al., supra note 19, at 548 R
(“Status-based targeting means that belligerent personnel qualify as lawful objects of attack at all times
and in all places for as long as they remain under the operational command and control of enemy leader-
ship and are physically capable of acting under that authority.”); Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status
Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in International Humanitarian Law Facing New Chal-
lenges 145, 148 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007) (“[O]rdinary combatants
. . . can be attacked (and killed) wherever they are, in and out of uniform: even when they are not on
active duty. There is no prohibition either of opening fire on retreating troops (who have not surren-
dered) or of targeting individual combatants.”).
53. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02, 57(6) PD 285, ¶
18 (2005) (Isr.).
54. Id. ¶ 2.
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a less harmful means can be employed.”55 Notably, the Court derived the
general authority to conduct such attacks from IHL—which it found appli-
cable to the circumstances in dispute—but to support the LRM restriction
on such attacks it cited instead to IHRL jurisprudence concerning the right
to life.56
I do not exclude the possibility that human rights norms may play a role
in the regulation of killing in wartime, but that argument does not avoid
interrogation of IHL. That is because the co-application approach rests on
assumptions about the inter-relationship between IHRL and IHL which
themselves hinge on the strength and nature of IHL’s necessity principle. To
understand why, consider the following ways in which IHRL might interre-
late with IHL.
One approach, endorsed by the International Court of Justice in its 1996
advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, dictates that IHL is
itself a body of IHRL.57 Hence, the Court allowed that “[i]n principle, the
[IHRL] right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hos-
tilities,” but it specified that “[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation
of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate
the conduct of hostilities.”58 If one reads this conceptualization strictly to
exclude the application of non-IHL principles, then the invocation of IHRL
has no practical impact. It is IHL itself that supplies the relevant IHRL
standards.59
In the Targeted Killing Case, the Israeli Supreme Court was not entirely
clear on how it reconciled its consideration of IHRL with the lex specialis
aspect of IHL. In part of its opinion, the Court emphasized the balance
between military necessity and human dignity, such that “human rights are
protected by the law of armed conflict, but not to their full scope.”60 Per-
haps, then, the Court applied a second approach, deriving an LRM require-
ment from its own independent determination of how military necessity
should be balanced against the right to life. But this possibility begs a ques-
tion: considering that IHL itself strikes a balance between the protection of
human life and the demands of military necessity, what basis is there for
interpreting IHRL to demand a different balance than the one that the de-
tailed requirements of IHL endorse? Moreover, the balancing itself requires
55. Id. ¶ 40.
56. Id.; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3) (permitting attack on civilians “for such R
time as they take a direct part in hostilities”).
57. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25
(July 8).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin & Larry May, Necessity in International Law 223 (2016)
(observing that “this mildest form of co-application has little or no practical consequences above an IHL-
only view”).
60. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02, 57(6) PD 285, ¶
22.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 15  7-MAR-18 10:38
2018 / Targeted Capture 15
interpretation of IHL: one cannot weigh the principle of military necessity
against other values without taking a position on how much weight that
principle exerts in a given situation. Doing so with respect to LRM obliga-
tions requires one to first consider the compatibility of LRM obligations
with the necessity principle.
A third, more plausible, approach looks to IHRL for guidance only when
IHL does not speak with sufficient clarity. That, for example, was the con-
clusion reached by a 2010 study on targeted killing by Philip Alston, serv-
ing then as the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions. After noting that “[b]oth
IHL and human rights law apply in the context of armed conflict,” and that
“whether a particular killing is legal is determined by the applicable lex
specialis,” the Report offers the following rule of interpretation: “[t]o the
extent that IHL does not provide a rule, or the rule is unclear and its mean-
ing cannot be ascertained from the guidance offered by IHL principles, it is
appropriate to draw guidance from human rights law.”61
Here, too, there are complications given the contrasting normative
frameworks embraced by these two bodies of law.62 Most critical for my
purposes, however, is that IHL also plays a central role under this version of
co-application. To apply IHRL one must first conclude either that “IHL
does not provide a rule,” or that the meaning of an existing, but unclear,
rule “cannot be ascertained from the guidance offered by IHL principles.”63
And these are precisely the conclusions that LRM opponents refuse to draw
with respect to the existence of a general LRM obligation. They argue, in-
stead, that the rules and principles of IHL leave no room for such obligations
beyond the specific restrictions already codified in IHL. They argue that
recognizing such an obligation would do great damage to IHL.64
Finding space for IHRL in this debate therefore requires one to defeat the
arguments of those who maintain that no such space exists. And doing so
requires one to engage the very IHL debates that are the focus of this
Article.
C. Constitutional Rights
I will consider U.S. constitutional law only briefly. As a domestic law
constraint, the U.S. Constitution has only limited scope: it restricts only the
conduct of U.S. government actors, and current judicial understandings
limit its application overseas.65 Hence, the constitutional debate has focused
on the specific scenario in which the U.S. government conducts a targeted
61. Alston Report, supra note 12, ¶ 29; see also Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 26, at 289. R
62. For an extensive discussion of this problem, see Ohlin & May, supra note 59, at 126–39. R
63. Alston Report, supra note 12, ¶ 29. R
64. See infra Section IV.A.
65. See generally Kai Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of
Territoriality in American Law (2009).
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killing of a U.S. citizen, as was the case with the strike on Anwar al-Aulaqi.
Even in that limited scenario, moreover, the appeal to U.S. constitutional
rights—including, in particular, the Fifth Amendment right to life whose
deprivation requires due process of law—faces the same basic obstacle as
does the analogous IHRL right to life. In its memorandum justifying the
killing of al-Aulaqi, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Coun-
sel (“OLC”) acknowledged that “[b]ecause al-Aulaqi is a U.S. citizen, the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process, as well as the Fourth Amendment, likely
protects him in some respects even while he is abroad.”66 Nevertheless the
memorandum suggests that the laws of war provide a lex specialis, such that
“the military may constitutionally use force against a U.S. citizen who is
part of enemy forces.”67 The memorandum further concludes that al-Au-
laqi’s killing would not violate any applicable constitutional protection con-
sidering, inter alia, the threat that al-Aulaqi posed and the representation by
both the CIA and Department of Defense that “an operation . . . to capture
al-Aulaqi in Yemen would be infeasible at this time.”68
The idea that constitutional rights could provide some additional source
of obligation does find some support in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which ruled that Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, had
a right under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to challenge his
detention by the President as an enemy combatant.69 Notably, Justice Clar-
ence Thomas argued in dissent that the approach advocated by a plurality of
the justices would also apply to “a decision to bomb a particular target,”
and “seems to require notice to potential targets.”70 This was not an invita-
tion the plurality was willing to accept, however, and the OLC Memoran-
dum on the al-Aulaqi killing emphasizes that the plurality “accord[ed] the
greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities
in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize[d] that
the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide.”71
Despite this acknowledgment, the plurality did not go so far as to pre-
clude categorically the application of constitutional rights to the conduct of
warfare. Moreover, the distinction between “the actual prosecution of war”72
and the detention of enemy combatants is not completely air tight, sug-
gesting perhaps that there might be some basis for extending the Hamdi
analysis to the former context. Indeed, the due process rights at issue in
Hamdi concerned Hamdi’s ability to contest the government’s determination
66. OLC Memorandum, supra note 6, at 38. R
67. Id.; see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 6, at 3 (“The Supreme Court has held that the military R
may constitutionally use force against a U.S. citizen who is part of enemy forces.”).
68. OLC Memorandum, supra note 6, at 40. R
69. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion). There was no majority opin-
ion; a total of eight justices agreed that some constitutional protections applied. Id. at 573 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
70. Id. at 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. OLC Memorandum, supra note 6, at 40–41 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535). R
72. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
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that he was in fact a detainable enemy combatant. Status determination is
also critical to combat operations where the principle of distinction prohib-
its attacks on civilians.73 If the Due Process Clause constrains the govern-
ment’s ability to classify Hamdi as a combatant for detention purposes,
should it not also restrain the government’s ability to do so for targeting
purposes? Of course, the realities of the battlefield will often preclude the
trial-type process demanded by the Hamdi plurality in the detention con-
text, but in some situations, such as a long-planned targeted killing opera-
tion, a greater degree of procedural protection would seem feasible.74
Some scholars have advanced arguments along these lines, maintaining
that constitutional rights do indeed provide an independent source of pro-
tection when the government targets U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.75
Whatever the answer to that debate may be, however, it cannot not support
a general, universal LRM obligation of the sort that IHL might impose.
Relying on constitutional law rather than international law to support an
LRM requirement also has the normatively questionable result of producing
a two-tiered system of war according to which the United States applies
different standards when targeting its own citizens abroad than it does when
targeting most foreign citizens.76 And this distinction once again under-
scores the highly limited scope of constitutional arguments to restrict the
73. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 48 (“[T]he Parties to the conflict shall at all times R
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”); id. art. 57(2)(a)
(“[T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . [d]o everything feasible to verify that the objec-
tives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.”).
74. Notably, however, IHL itself regulates these determinations. It does so principally through the
requirement that the attacking forces “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objec-
tives.” Id. art. 57(2)(i). Additional Protocol I also provides the evidentiary presumption that “[i]n case of
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.” Id. art. 50. On this
issue, see generally Adil Haque, Killing in the Fog of War, 86. S. Cal. L. Rev. 63 (2012). Although
Additional Protocol I does not elaborate on specific verification techniques, it would appear self-evident
that long-planned operations against named targets permit more robust verification processes than are
feasible in the heat of combat. The more important question, then, is not whether constitutional protec-
tions apply at all in this context, but instead whether they operate to alter the obligations already ex-
isting under IHL. One could argue that the constitutional due process framework, benefited by the
balancing test applied in Hamdi, provides more detailed guidance than IHL on how verification should
work, therefore supporting a version of co-application that allows constitutional law to fill in details not
addressed by international legal sources. But even under this approach, the application of constitutional
protections presupposes a compatibility between IHL and constitutional due process.
75. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31
Cardozo L. Rev. 405, 410–12 (2009); Deborah Pearlstein, Enhancing Due Process in Targeted Killing, Am.
Const. Soc’y for Law & Pol. Issue Brief 6–11 (Oct. 2013), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/
files/Pearlstein_-_Due_Process_in_Targeted_Killing.pdf; cf. H. Jefferson Powell, Targeting Amer-
icans: The Constitutionality of the U.S. Drone War 65 (2016) (maintaining that “Bill of Rights
prohibitions do not apply to legitimate military exercises of the federal government’s war powers”).
76. I put aside for these purposes the question of what protections might apply to aliens, such as
permanent residents, who have a significant connection to the United States. See, e.g., United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) (rejecting the extension of Fourth Amendment rights
to an alien abroad “with no voluntary attachment to the United States”). Nor do I consider the legal
framework applicable to a targeted killing conducted on U.S. territory. See id. at 271 (acknowledging
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conduct of hostilities abroad. These arguments apply only to the U.S. gov-
ernment, and only to actions it takes against a subset of targets. Hence, they
address only a small minority of wartime killings.
II. IHL’s Prohibitions
Another line of argument dictates that IHL imposes a general LRM re-
quirement through its express restraints on the principle of military neces-
sity. Recent work by Ryan Goodman presents perhaps the most sustained
defense of this position. Goodman argues that “[t]he international rules of
warfare require nations to capture instead of kill enemy fighters, especially
when lethal force is not the only way to take them off the battlefield.”77
Notably, Goodman views LRM obligations as a relatively recent innovation:
through the first part of the twentieth century it was the Grotian rule that
“killing is a right of war” which prevailed, but by the late 1970s the law
came to embrace LRM obligations.78 His evidence lies in two provisions of
Additional Protocol I: (1) the treaty’s prohibition of means and methods of
warfare that are “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suf-
fering,”79 and (2) its stipulation that one who is “in the power of an adverse
Party” has become “hors de combat” and accordingly “shall not be the object
of attack.”80 To support this position, Goodman invokes both the treaty text
and external sources such as the ICRC’s commentary to Additional Protocol
I, and the records of expert and diplomatic opinion preceding and surround-
ing the treaty’s adoption.81
This position has proven controversial, with Goodman’s interpretive ap-
proach sparking pushback.82 IHL’s regulation of injury and suffering does
not, argue Goodman’s critics, extend to the infliction of death per se, and
thus provides no support for a general LRM requirement. Nor, according to
this view, do the hors de combat protections prohibit the killing of belliger-
ents who have not surrendered, been captured, or become physically
incapacitated.
As I argue in this Part, Goodman is half right. The best reading of Article
35(2) does indeed restrict lethal force in a manner that will sometimes favor
capture over killing. But the focus on that particular claim distracts from a
larger problem: Article 35(2) only prohibits injury that is “superfluous” and
Supreme Court precedent establishing “that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country”).
77. Goodman, The Lesser Evil, supra note 18. R
78. Id.
79. Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 848 (quoting Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. R
35); Goodman, The Lesser Evil, supra note 18. R
80. Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 832 (quoting Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. R
41(2)); Goodman, The Lesser Evil, supra note 18. R
81. See Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 839–52. R
82. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. R
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suffering that is “unnecessary.”83 Hence, the most natural reading of Article
35(2) does not limit the principle of military necessity. Instead, it regulates
actions that lack military necessity in the first instance. As with the appeal
to IHRL and constitutional law, the hope that IHL establishes an express
LRM constraint on military necessity proves illusory. Instead, it is the prin-
ciple of military necessity itself that requires interrogation. And unless Ad-
ditional Protocol I codified an evolution of that principle, the notion that
Additional Protocol I spurred a transformation with respect to an LRM re-
quirement is also illusory.
At the same time, Article 35(2) remains critically important for what it
reveals about the necessity principle. Whether or not its particular scope
extends to kill or capture questions, the operation of Article 35(2) presup-
poses the ability of combatants to make common sense judgments about the
limits of necessity that would be insupportable according to the most far-
reaching understandings of that principle. In this way, Article 35(2) con-
firms that the necessity principle is not quite so broad as sometimes sup-
posed, and that conclusion has important implications for the debate over
LRM.
A. Article 35(2)
Article 35 of Additional Protocol I begins with a basic rule: “In any
armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or
means of warfare is not unlimited.”84 It further specifies that “[i]t is prohib-
ited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”85
This prohibition has a history. It is the successor to a provision in the
1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of Wars on
Lands, which declares it illegal to “[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”86 That 1907 prohibition is itself
the successor to a provision of the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land which prohibits the “employ [of]
arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury.”87 Both
of these provisions, in turn, trace their lineage to the Saint Petersburg Dec-
laration of 1868 which addressed the emergence of exploding bullets caus-
ing far greater injury than those caused by conventional bullets.88 The treaty
renounces the use of these projectiles on the grounds that the “only legiti-
83. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 35(2). R
84. Id. art. 35(1).
85. Id. art. 35(2).
86. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
87. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land art. 23, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
88. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, Dec. 11,
1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Decla-
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mate object” of war is to “weaken the military forces of the enemy,” and
that “for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number
of men.” Accordingly, it would be “contrary to the laws of humanity” to
employ “arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable.”89
Goodman argues that Additional Protocol I enacts a more general prohi-
bition against the needless killing of combatants, and he marshals support
from the drafting history and Commentary to Additional Protocol I to
maintain that Article 35(2) implements Jean Pictet’s lesser evil formula,
according to which
[i]f we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we
should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by
wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to
achieve the same military advantage, we must choose the one
which causes the lesser evil.90
Indeed, part of Goodman’s argument is that the very idea of a Pictet formula
is something of a misnomer, as that label misleadingly attributes this view
to a single individual when, in fact, Pictet’s approach was uncontroversial
among the leading experts of the day and even, it would seem, among mem-
bers of the U.S. delegation to the 1974 Lucerne Conference on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons.91
This interpretation has not gone unchallenged. An article co-authored by
four U.S. IHL experts—three of whom have significant military experi-
ence—maintains that:
Employing deadly combat power against a belligerent operative
when capture might have been a feasible alternative for subduing
him has never been considered to violate the prohibition against
inflicting unnecessary suffering. Instead, the principle prohibits
employing methods or means of warfare that cause death in a way
considered by the international community to be unnecessarily
painful or pernicious (for example, chemical weapons), or that
needlessly aggravate the suffering of an opponent who survives
attack but is rendered hors de combat.92
Jens Ohlin likewise argues that “[A]rticle 35 appears to do the exact oppo-
site from what Goodman wants it to do: it gives attacking forces license to
quickly and cleanly kill enemy combatants, and prohibits them from in-
ration]; see Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering: From the Declaration
of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol 1 of 1977, 34 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 98, 102 (1994).
89. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 88.
90. Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law 75–76
(1985).
91. Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 839–52. R
92. Corn et al., supra note 19, at 555. R
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flicting injuries that needlessly prolong their pain.”93 Kevin Jon Heller also
identifies a “fundamental problem with Ryan’s interpretation of Art. 35(2):
he is trying to shoehorn a prohibition on unnecessary killing into a prohibi-
tion that—as has long been assumed by scholars—deals solely with prevent-
ing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to combatants who survive
an attack with a particular weapon.”94
1. Injury and Suffering
Puzzling through this debate reveals several interpretive complexities sur-
rounding Goodman’s argument. Much of the disagreement has focused on
the ordinary meaning of the text, and in particular, the choice of the words
“injury” and “suffering.” Article 35(2), notes Heller, “does not expressly
prohibit unnecessary killing per se, nor does it broadly prohibit unnecessary
‘harm.’ ” 95 Had the drafters intended to regulate unnecessary killing, he ar-
gues, they would have done so more explicitly.96 In response, Goodman
points out that dead combatants are killed by mortal injuries and argues
that “Heller has a considerable burden to show that ‘injury’ does not include
this subset (and most severe form) of injury.”97
So framed, the textual validity of Goodman’s position would appear to
hinge on whether the word “injury” is broad enough to encompass death,
but closer examination reveals that the real dispute lies elsewhere. The nar-
row reading of “injury,” for instance, is entirely compatible with the por-
tion of the Pictet formula that demands less injurious means over more
injurious means, even with respect to nonlethal force. Yet, neither Heller
nor Goodman’s other critics appear to concede that combatants attempting a
live capture of a combatant must avoid injuring their opponent if there is a
feasible non-injurious method of capture available (such as shouting “hands
up” before inflicting a nonlethal wound).
Likewise, a prohibition on unnecessary killing is also consistent with a
narrow interpretation of the word “injury.” Killing in wartime is accom-
plished by the infliction of physical injuries. Even if death itself is not a
form of injury per se, a physical injury might still be “superfluous” on the
ground that its only purpose is to cause death unnecessarily.98 Hence, it
93. Ohlin, Recapturing, supra note 19, at 26. R
94. Heller, supra note 19; see also Ohlin & May, supra note 59, at 223 (agreeing with Heller that R
“[i]n the absence of [the terms unnecessary killing or unnecessary death], unnecessary suffering simply
refers to pain and suffering related to injury, not death”).
95. Heller, Capture-or-Kill Debate #8, supra note 19. R
96. Id.
97. Ryan Goodman, The Capture-or-Kill Debate #10: Goodman Responds to Heller, Lawfare (Mar. 12,
2013, 1:13 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/capture-or-kill-debate-10-goodman-responds-heller.
98. Even Heller appears to accept this conclusion—or at least does not outright reject it—with re-
spect to “weapons that not only disable a combatant, but also inevitably cause him to die from his
wounds after the battle is over.” Kevin Jon Heller, A Response to Goodman About the (Supposed) Duty to
Capture, Opinio Juris (Mar. 13, 2013, 7:15 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/03/13/a-response-to-good-
man-about-the-supposed-duty-to-capture/.
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would appear that the real question is not how to define the word “injury”
in isolation, but instead, how to define the range of alternative choices that
makes an injury “superfluous.”
A similar observation applies to the prohibition relating to “unnecessary
suffering,” which Goodman stipulates, “for the sake of argument,” does not
regulate the infliction of death.99 Putting aside the indirect emotional suf-
fering of third parties such as grieving comrades and relatives, one may stip-
ulate that instantaneous death causes no suffering. But death in wartime
often is not instantaneous. Commonly, mortal wounds cause suffering before
they cause death. Hence, there remains the possibility that Article 35(2)
separately restricts the infliction of non-instantaneous death preceded by
predictable suffering that could easily have been avoided by alternate means
of incapacitation (including either instantaneous killing or capture).
As I understand it, however, the core objection to Goodman’s interpreta-
tion focuses not on the definition of injury, but instead on the assumption
that Article 35(2) applies to capture-or-kill / capture-or-injure decisions at
all.100 Yet if that is the position, then one might turn the textual objection
on its head: if the drafters of Additional Protocol I meant to exclude these
sorts of choices from regulation by this Article, why did they not make that
limitation explicit?
2. Methods of Warfare
A further complication—one that has received less attention in the debate
over LRM but which might answer the question just posed—lies in the
remaining language of that provision. As written, Article 35(2) does not
prohibit the general infliction of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,
however defined. It limits the prohibition to the employment of “weapons,
projectiles and material and methods of warfare” that are “of a nature” to
produce these consequences.101 As a matter of ordinary meaning, this lan-
guage lends itself better to some applications than to others. For instance,
one can readily see how Article 35(2) operates to prohibit certain kinds of
weapons—such as expanding bullets and poisonous gases (both the subject
of previous treaty prohibitions)—based on the nature of the injury and suf-
fering that those weapons inflict.102 On the other hand, contrast the example
of a soldier who makes a split-second decision to fatally shoot an opponent
rather than attempt capture. One may stipulate that the soldier’s decision
results in superfluous injury, but does that make the decision a “method” of
warfare that is “of a nature” to cause such suffering?
99. Goodman, supra note 97.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 35(2) R
102. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of Wars on Lands, supra note 85, annex art.
23.
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The ICRC’s Commentary to Additional Protocol I leaves the answer to
this question somewhat opaque. Addressing Article 35(1)’s separate state-
ment that “[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited,” the Commentary
observes as follows:
The words “methods and means” include weapons in the widest
sense, as well as the way in which they are used. The use that is
made of a weapon can be unlawful in itself, or it can be unlawful
only under certain conditions. For example, poison is unlawful in
itself, as would be any weapon which would, by its very nature, be
so imprecise that it would inevitably cause indiscriminate dam-
age. It would automatically fall under the prohibition of Article
57 (Precautions in attack), paragraph 2(a)(ii). However, a weapon
that can be used with precision can also be abusively used against
the civilian population. In this case, it is not the weapon which is
prohibited, but the method or the way in which it is used.103
Although there is nothing in this language that directly addresses Article
35(2), its approach has direct relevance for that provision as well. The final
sentence of the passage makes reasonably clear that firing a permitted
weapon is a “method of warfare,” and that one who does so abusively vio-
lates IHL in the same way as does someone who employs a prohibited
weapon “whose very nature” is to cause prohibited damage.104 But this con-
trast between the nature of weapons, on the one hand, and the method of
their use, on the other hand, creates difficulties for the interpretation of
Article 35(2)’s prohibition on both “weapons” and “methods of warfare”
that are “of a nature” to cause prohibited harm. The Commentary does not
expressly identify a method of warfare that possesses such a nature.
Returning to the example of a soldier who shoots an opponent whom he
might have captured, one could argue that the relevant method of warfare is
simply the firing of the weapon, and that there is nothing in the very nature
of that act that produces superfluous injury. A drawback of that interpreta-
tion is that it appears to permit even paradigmatic inflictions of superfluous
injury and suffering such as when a solider deliberately shoots a victim in a
part of the body calculated to ensure a slow and painful death, or with a
view to maim for life. Avoiding that result—as other passages of the Com-
mentary appear to do, albeit without confronting this particular lan-
guage105—requires characterizing the method of warfare more specifically,
103. ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1402. R
104. Id.; see also, e.g., Meyrowitz, supra note 88, at 103 (“[In] Article 35 (2), ‘methods of warfare’ is to
be understood as the mode of use of means of warfare in accordance with a certain military concept or
tactic.”).
105. See ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1424 (“It is worth
noting that none of the rules explicitly protects combatants from incendiary weapons such as flame-
throwers or napalm. However, it is generally admitted that these weapons should not be used in such a
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for instance as the targeting of a weapon in a manner expected to increase
suffering.106 So framed, the nature of the method does produce the prohib-
ited result. But that framing also supports the extension of Article 35(2) to
kill or capture decisions: shooting to cause superfluous death may likewise
be characterized as a distinct method of warfare whose nature produces pro-
hibited harms.
I am not sure that the answer to this particular interpretive puzzle has
critical importance to the debate over LRM, however. The clearest effect of
the more restrictive interpretation is not to ignore consideration of LRM
altogether but instead to focus responsibility on decisions that are made at a
policy level rather than those made at the ground level by individual com-
batants. Imagine, for example, that my hypothetical combatant is a member
of a special forces unit that has been dispatched to conduct a targeted killing
against an individual target. Imagine, moreover, that this killing is con-
ducted pursuant to a general policy of targeted killings that gives no weight
whatsoever to the feasibility of capture, demanding instead the use of lethal
force even in situations where capture could be conducted without incurring
additional expense or presenting additional risks or burdens to the forces
conducting the operation.
On these facts, the language of Article 35(2) presents a less awkward fit.
It is sensible to describe the targeted killing policy (along with its associated
rules of engagement) as a method of warfare pursuant to Additional Protocol
I. And clearly, it is the nature of the policy to demand lethal force even in
cases where non-injurious alternatives are available.
3. Article 35(2) and Military Necessity
Treaty interpretation, however, does not conclude merely with considera-
tion of the text’s ordinary meaning, and neither does the debate over Article
35(2). Goodman marshals a variety of sources from before, during, and after
the drafting of Additional Protocol I to support his claim that Article 35(2)
codifies Pictet’s LRM formula. As Goodman reveals, the famous endorse-
ment of LRM attributed solely to the former ICRC President by Hays Parks
actually appears in the final report of an expert group meeting held in Ge-
way that they will cause unnecessary suffering, which means that in particular they should not be used
against individuals without cover.”).
106. This position finds support in the observation that the words “of a nature” were chosen as a
substitute for “calculated to.” Id. ¶ 1426 (“The Conference certainly considered that the expression
‘calculated to cause,’ which was used in English as an equivalent of the French expression ‘propre a`’, and
which can be found in the 1907 version of the Hague Regulations was not appropriate, and consequently
the text was amended to ‘of a nature to.’ ”). Perhaps then, the point was to de-emphasize intent with a
looser mental requirement. However, the problem seems instead to have been that “calculated to” offered
a poor translation of the French version of the same prohibition. See Meyrowtiz, supra note 88, at 102
(noting that Article 35(2) modified the “principle expressed in [the] 1899 and 1907 [Hague Conven-
tions] by designating it as a ‘basic rule’, by adding the words ‘methods of warfare’ . . . and by replacing
the expression ‘calculated to’ by ‘of a nature to’—although in French the corresponding expressions
(‘propres a`’ and ‘de nature a`’) have exactly the same meaning”).
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neva in 1973 and reflects the opinion of the entire group, including Pictet
and others.107 Goodman identifies further support for this position in a 1970
report of the U.N. Secretary General, the proceedings of the 1974 intergov-
ernmental Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons of the Diplomatic
Conference, and the writings of several IHL experts.108 Perhaps most nota-
bly, the ICRC’s own commentary to Additional Protocol I contains several
passages lending support to the existence of an LRM requirement that ap-
plies to capture/injure/kill choices.109 Moreover, Goodman cites evidence
that the choice of the phrase “unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury”
in Article 35(2) marked a deliberate attempt to reconcile the English version
of the phrase with the French version’s “maux superflus” precisely so as to
make clear (as the French allegedly does) that the prohibition “conveys the
further notion of superfluous deaths.”110
The reliance on these sources is also contested, both with regard to their
interpretation and relevance. Heller, for instance, has argued that they do
not support as broad a vision of LRM as the one that Goodman identifies.111
Ohlin, on the other hand, acknowledges that Goodman’s “work does not
stand alone,” but instead “exists in a line of diplomatic and scholarly at-
tempts to redefine the concept of necessity to give it more regulatory
bite.”112 He allows that Goodman has “performed an important and invalu-
able service by enriching our understanding of the 1973 and 1974 confer-
ences that eventually resulted in the adoption of Additional Protocol I and
Additional Protocol II,” but nevertheless concludes that “Pictet was wrong
in his reading of core IHL principles.”113
Although I do not agree entirely with this assessment (subject to the
further proviso that, as I shall explore below, there is some ambiguity re-
garding what, if anything, distinguishes Ohlin’s position from Goodman’s),
Ohlin is right to focus attention on the relationship between the alleged
LRM obligation and military necessity. This issue is of critical importance
not only to the theory of IHL, but to the interpretation of Article 35(2)
itself. After all, Article 35(2) does not prohibit the infliction of suffering and
injury under all circumstances. It only does so with respect to suffering that
is “unnecessary” and injury that is “superfluous.” If Article 35(2) does es-
tablish an LRM obligation, the obligation triggers only when this threshold
is met. Hence, the choice of language raises another, more critical question
that has received inadequate attention in the debate: what, if anything, dis-
107. Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 841–42. R
108. Id. at 839–52.
109. Id. at 848–52.
110. Goodman, supra note 97 (quoting Meyrowitz, supra note 88, at 104). R
111. See Heller, supra note 19.
112. Ohlin, Recapturing, supra note 19, at 2. R
113. Id. at 21, 23. In more recent work, Ohlin and May have also challenged Goodman’s account of
the drafting history, arguing that there was greater disagreement on the matter of LRM obligations than
Goodman allows. See Ohlin & May, supra note 59, at 221 (“[W]e do not read the travaux preparatoires of R
the Additional Protocols as supporting a duty to use non-lethal force.”).
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tinguishes Article 35(2) from the principle of military necessity itself? Con-
sider the following possibilities.
a. Is Article 35(2) co-extensive with military necessity?
As a matter of ordinary meaning, the most plausible interpretation is that
Article 35(2) deals only with actions that lack support in military necessity.
The choice of the word “unnecessary” to modify “suffering” may convey
that meaning most directly: suffering inflicted for reasons of military neces-
sity is presumably not “unnecessary.” But the choice of the phrase “super-
fluous injury” is equally telling in how it suggests—without reference to
the specialized meaning of necessity in the military context—that Article
35(2) is highly deferential to military judgment. As a prima facie matter at
least, injuries that might be avoidable according to some strict conception of
necessity would appear to be non-superfluous so long as they are inflicted
with a view to achieving some tangible military advantage—however mod-
est—as compared to other methods of incapacitation.
This conclusion may seem unremarkable, even obvious, yet it has several
profound implications for the debate regarding LRM that have thus far gone
unobserved. One implication concerns how this interpretation facilitates a
formal agreement between proponents and opponents of an LRM require-
ment. Article 35(2) does indeed require LRM in lieu of unnecessary killing,
one might concede. But the victory for LRM is pyrrhic, the opponents will
argue, because the expansive approach to military necessity prevailing in
legal tradition ensures that Article 35(2) does not actually trigger an LRM
obligation in any of the cases that LRM advocates actually care about. One
can oppose that conclusion, but doing so requires going beyond Article
35(2). The real dispute has to do with the principle of military necessity and
how that principle drives the application of Article 35(2).
Another important implication of this interpretation is that it compli-
cates Goodman’s position that the LRM requirement is a mid-twentieth
century innovation.114 If Additional Protocol I does indeed confirm a trans-
formation within IHL with respect to LRM obligations, Article 35(2)—
under this view—cannot be the locus of that transformation. If that provi-
sion merely prohibits actions that are already unlicensed by military neces-
sity, then Article 35(2) alone adds relatively little. The argument must
further establish that the principle of military necessity itself—which is not
defined anywhere in Additional Protocol I—underwent such a
transformation.
A third implication is that Article 35(2)’s dependence upon the principle
of military necessity has the apparent effect of making Article 35(2) redun-
dant. Since military necessity is already a basic requirement of force in war-
time, why does the law require a specific prohibition addressing unnecessary
114. Goodman, The Lesser Evil, supra note 18. R
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injury and suffering? Interestingly, this critique—based on Article 35(2)’s
impotence—mirrors a critique that Ohlin levels against Goodman for the
opposite reason that Goodman’s reading makes Article 35(2) too robust. On
Ohlin’s account, the problem with reading Article 35(2) to prohibit unnec-
essary killing is that other provisions of IHL become redundant. “[T]he spe-
cific prohibitions of jus in bello must become superfluous,” argues Ohlin,
“once they are swamped by the more general principle that Goodman pur-
ports to find in their penumbra.”115
But this concern about redundancy—in either guise—may prove too
much. There is nothing inherently incoherent or illogical about a legal re-
gime that embraces both a general prohibition on actions that lack military
necessity and more specific rules that either fall within or supplement the
broader prohibition. The specific rules—such as those regulating hors de com-
bat status—may clarify the general prohibition by providing more concrete
guidance on its operation, or they may tighten that prohibition by restrict-
ing activities not otherwise covered by the general rule. In either instance,
there is still value to a general prohibition that is broad enough to encom-
pass circumstances not explicitly addressed by the specific rules. And con-
sidering that Additional Protocol I does not otherwise include a general
statement of the necessity principle, a key purpose Article 35(2) may simply
be to reinforce the centrality of military necessity to the permissible inflic-
tion of suffering and injury.
In addition, it makes sense that a more general prohibition against the
infliction of unnecessary harm would coexist with specific prohibitions that
either restrict the principle of necessity or elucidate its meaning in specific
contexts. It might well be, for example, (as would follow from Goodman’s
interpretation) that killing a combatant who has surrendered or become in-
capacitated by wounds violates Article 35(2), thus making redundant Arti-
cle 41(1)’s specific prohibition on doing so. Even if so, Article 41(1) remains
valuable by supplying more specific guidance on the boundaries of necessity
than would be provided by Article 35(2) alone. The general prohibition in
Article 35(2), meanwhile, remains operative in residual cases not covered by
this and other express prohibitions.
That is not the end of the analysis, however, because this interpretation of
Article 35(2)—according to which it forbids the infliction of only such suf-
fering and injury as lacks support in military necessity—faces a deeper prob-
lem. If indeed IHL truly embraces the broadest understanding of military
necessity that permits “any amount and kind of force to compel the com-
plete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time,
life, and money,” then Article 35(2) appears to become toothless even with
regard to its non-controversial scope.116 For instance, using exploding bul-
115. Ohlin, Recapturing, supra note 19, at 6. R
116. United States v. List (The Hostages Case), XI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals 1230, 1253 (1948).
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lets—a paradigmatic Article 35(2) violation117—becomes justifiable so long
as doing so helps subdue the enemy in ways not as readily achievable by
other means—for example, by preventing or delaying the return of wounded
opponents to the battlefield or by deterring new recruits from joining the
fight.118
If Article 35(2) is merely parasitic upon the necessity principle, then res-
cuing its prohibition requires acknowledging that necessity is not quite so
permissive as the broadest interpretation would suggest. Unless it is a dead
letter, the article presupposes that necessity does not in fact extend to claims
as tenuous as the one just described. Remarkably, this reading of Article
35(2) provides support for an LRM obligation whether or not one reads
Article 35(2) itself to establish that obligation. The primary contribution of
Article 35(2) may be to confirm limitations on the broader necessity princi-
ple that are transferable to the LRM debate.
I realize that this line of argument may appear to head down a path that
even Goodman disavows: the argument comes close to suggesting that one
restriction (a general obligation to consider LRM) can be derived analogi-
cally from the rationale underlying another restriction (a prohibition on cer-
tain types of weapons).119 The problem with this approach, explains Ohlin,
is that it upsets the delicate balance according to which IHL endorses both a
broad permission to deploy lethal force and identifies specific restraints on
that prohibition.120 This reasoning by analogy threatens that balance, it
would seem, by discovering additional restrictions that may end up swal-
lowing the rule.
117. ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1420 (“The weapons [in- R
cluding exploding bullets] which are prohibited under the provisions of the Hague Law are, a fortiori,
prohibited under the paragraph of Article 35 with which we are concerned here.”).
118. The point that such weapons might indeed achieve some military advantage in this way was
acknowledged by the report of a 1973 expert group meeting, which noted that:
Clearly the authors of the ban on dum-dum bullets felt that the hit of an ordinary rifle bullet
was enough to put a man out of action and that infliction of a more severe wound by a bullet
which flattened would be to cause “unnecessary suffering” or “superfluous injury.” The cir-
cumstance that a more severe wound is likely to put a soldier out of action for a longer period
was evidently not considered a justification for permitting the use of bullets achieving such
results.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate
Effects: Report on the Work of Experts, ¶ 23 (1973); see also Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at R
836–37 (“For example, if a lawful objective is to disable as many combatants as possible to remove them
from the battle field, presumably the law would permit military means that ensure that those fighters
would not return to battle ever again. So why not allow weapons deliberately designed to render their
deaths inevitable? If enemy fighters never get off the operating table, is that not optimal in terms of
military objectives?”).
119. See Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 836–37; Ryan Goodman, The Capture-or-Kill R
Debate # 11: Goodman Responds to Ohlin, Lawfare (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/capture-
or-kill-debate-11-goodman-responds-ohlin (noting that his article “steer[s] clear of deriving a general
principle from the specific prohibitions and structure of LOAC” because “that line of analysis is not
sustainable.”).
120. Ohlin, Duty to Capture, supra note 11, at 1322.
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But that concern is unwarranted in light of how Article 35(2) is drafted.
The Article does not, for example, list certain classes of weapons and meth-
ods of warfare which are prohibited notwithstanding their potential margi-
nal contribution to military advantage. Such a formulation might indeed
caution strongly against the analogical derivation of other restrictions not
identified. Instead, Article 35(2) appeals to general concepts of necessity and
superfluity to implement a more general prohibition.121 It assumes that
these terms have prohibitory relevance and it trusts the informed reader to
understand how certain weapons and methods cannot be justified by mili-
tary necessity. Article 35(2) presupposes the existence of reasonable limits
on the necessity principle that restrain that principle independently from
obligations that impose external checks on necessity. And if such limits do
in fact exist, then one should also ask how they impact the debate over
LRM.
b. Does Article 35(2) demand more than military necessity?
There is, however, another possible reading of Article 35(2). Perhaps that
provision does not require such direct interrogation of the general military
necessity principle because the article instead codifies a different and stricter
necessity requirement for conduct within its scope. On this account, certain
weapons and methods of warfare that generally advance military necessity as
a prima facie matter might nevertheless violate Article 35(2) by virtue of the
injury or suffering they inflict.
Perhaps the strongest support for this view is the ICRC’s Commentary to
Additional Protocol I, which describes Article 35(2) in terms of a propor-
tionality test requiring one “to weigh up the nature of the injury or the
intensity of suffering on the one hand, against the ‘military necessity’, on
the other hand, before deciding whether there is a case of superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering as this term is understood in war.”122 So framed,
Article 35(2) does more than reinforce an internal limit within necessity.
But that reading is problematic given its apparent incompatibility with
the treaty text, which says nothing about balancing. The drafters of Addi-
tional Protocol I knew how to require balancing when they wanted to do so.
That is what the treaty’s proportionality requirement does when it forbids
attacks “expected to cause incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects,”
when such harm would “be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”123 The failure to provide likewise in Article
35(2) supports the general assumption that military necessity is sufficient to
121. And, indeed, within the treaty itself, Article 35 appears under the label of “Basic Rules,” rather
than among the more specifically labeled prohibitions that follow. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, R
art. 35.
122. ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1428; see also Goodman, R
Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 837–38 (citing numerous sources in support of this position). R
123. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b). R
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justify the killing of combatants but insufficient—without further balanc-
ing—to justify incidental harms to civilians and objects.
Of course, the ICRC’s contrary conclusion is hardly helpful to LRM oppo-
nents. Once combined with the ICRC’s additional conclusion in the same
commentary that Article 35 supports an LRM obligation,124 the balancing
approach produces a more robust version of that obligation, one that raises
the legal bar by rendering military necessity insufficient to justify the kill-
ing of an otherwise targetable combatant. Avoiding that conclusion requires
some interpretive acrobatics on the part of LRM opponents: the ICRC must
be right that Article 35(2) demands a proportionality approach (despite the
lack of explicit textual support in the treaty) while also wrong that Article
35(2) imposes an LRM obligation (despite more plausible textual support). I
am skeptical that such an interpretation can survive international law’s com-
mand that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”125
In sum, then, both readings of Article 35(2)’s necessity principle support
an LRM obligation. The most viable interpretation is that that obligation
exists within the principle of necessity itself rather than through any textual
innovation of Article 35(2). At the same time, the wording of Article 35(2)
suggests that the principle is not quite so broad as is sometimes supposed.
D. Article 41(1): Hors de Combat Status
The debate over LRM has also focused on another provision of Additional
Protocol I: Article 41(1)’s rule that a person “shall not be the object of
attack” if she “is in the power of an adverse Party.”126 The exemption from
attack on this basis exists independent of, and alongside, additional hors de
combat protections for those who have “clearly express[ed] an intention to
surrender,”127 and those who are “incapable of defending [themselves]” be-
cause they are either unconscious or “otherwise incapacitated by wounds or
sickness.”128 Goodman advances the “tentative[]” claim that the “in the
power of” category includes not only those who have already been captured
but, also, “combatants who are defenseless and at the complete mercy of an
124. ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1397 (reasoning that the R
broad Hostages formulation of necessity “has the disadvantage that it does not in fact take into account
the paragraph of Article 35 with which we are concerned, and therefore it cannot stand on its own.
Moreover, it should be quite clear that the requirement as to minimum loss of life and objects which is
included in this definition refers not only to the assailant, but also to the party attacked. If this were not
the case, the description would be completely inadequate.”).
125. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
126. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, arts. 41(1)–41(2)(a). R
127. Id. art. 41(2)(b).
128. Id. art. 41(2)(c).
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attacking party.”129 Although this interpretation would not establish an
LRM obligation per se (hors de combat status precludes attack entirely,
whether by lethal or nonlethal means), its effect is to render capture the only
option for attacking forces in at least some of the cases that might otherwise
be subject to an LRM obligation.
There is support for the view that the “in the power of” category includes
at least some individuals who have neither communicated an intention to
surrender nor fallen into the physical custody of the opposing side.130 Con-
sider, for instance, the case of a soldier who has abandoned his weapons and
left the fight without intending to surrender (perhaps he is trying to catch a
train home, or to a third country). The more difficult question concerns how
far this concept extends, including, for example, cases of momentary de-
fenselessness in which a short window of opportunity arises to safely and
easily capture a combatant who remains very much in the fight.  Such cases
present a more difficult fit considering, in particular, that hors de combat
status produces a blanket prohibition on attack, even if capture is not a
feasible alternative.131
It is possible to describe such a combatant as being momentarily “in the
power of” the opposing side, but that conclusion is hardly intuitive. If that
case can be made, then once again the critical question concerns the scope of
military necessity. Extending hors de combat status to cover a more expansive
set of scenarios is more plausible if one believes that these scenarios already
fall outside the permission afforded by military necessity.132 Failing that, the
129. Goodman, Goodman Responds to Ohlin, supra note 119; Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at R
830–836. Notably, the corresponding language of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions is more lim-
ited, extending protection only “in the case of capture by the enemy.” Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of Wars on Land, supra note 86, art. 3 (similar); Convention (II) with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of Wars on Land, supra note 87, art. 3 (similar).
130. See, e.g., Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts 252 (2d ed.
2013) (“Under customary rules, protection from attack begins when the individual has ceased to fight,
when his unit has surrendered, or when he is no longer capable of resistance either because he has been
overpowered or is weaponless.”); ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ R
1612 (“A defenceless adversary is hors de combat whether or not he has laid down arms.”); Howard S.
Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict 59 (1978); Schmitt, supra note 19, at R
860 (“It is here that I find common ground with Professor Goodman. I do not accept the premise that
defencelessness alone shields enemy forces or civilian direct participants from attack. But capture (and
detention) does not necessarily require taking the fighters into ‘custody.’ In some circumstances, an
individual has effectively been captured without an affirmative act on either the captor’s or prisoner’s
part, a point made, as Professor Goodman notes, by Professor Howard Levie decades ago.”). As Adil
Haque observes, there is language in the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I that suggests yet broader
interpretation of the hors de combat limitation, restricting even attacks by the airforce against defenseless
soldiers who cannot otherwise be captured. See Adil Haque, Law and Morality at War 102–03
(2017); ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1612 (discussing hors de R
combat protection in the context of an attack “conducted by the airforce, which can certainly have enemy
troops in its power without being able, or wishing, to take them into custody or accept a surrender (for
example, in the case of an attack by helicopters)”).
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132. Haque draws a similar connection between hors de combat protection and military necessity, not-
ing that “states could interpret ‘in the power’ to mean ‘both defenseless and susceptible to capture,’ ” but
that “such an approach seems to miss the point” because “[i]t is wrong to kill [such a combatant] not
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argument that Additional Protocol I packed a more fundamental transfor-
mation of military prerogative into the words “in the power of” is more
tenuous.
III. The Borders of Necessity
All roads, then, lead to the necessity principle: if there is a duty to choose
less restrictive means, then that duty exists within that principle as a limita-
tion on its reach. My defense of an LRM obligation begins with a basic
claim that should be uncontroversial: the law does not permit the unneces-
sary killing of combatants. As a formal matter, the debate over LRM reveals
no disagreement over this proposition. Indeed, despite its express rejection
of an LRM obligation,133 the Department of Defense Law of War Manual
also embraces the principle of humanity “that forbids the infliction of suf-
fering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate mili-
tary purpose.”134
The central controversy, as I have explained, concerns how one defines
what is unnecessary in light of the broad understanding of military necessity
that has prevailed historically.135 Complicating this interpretive question is
the general lack of specificity in the relevant treaties and other legal sources.
Additional Protocol I does not expressly state that combatants must prefer
less restrictive means when they are available. On the other hand, neither
that treaty nor any of the historical formulations of military necessity specify
that combatants may target their opponents with lethal force at any time no
matter how feasible and riskless capture might be, and no matter how much
the context of the killing might deviate from the traditional battlefield sce-
narios that inspired the IHL rules. Hence, this is not a question that can be
decided based on text alone without engaging in a further interpretive
exercise.
That exercise, in turn, must confront a tension between two interpretive
presumptions that one might invoke to resolve the issue. One presumption
derives a clear statement rule from the principle of military necessity. Ac-
cording to this view, IHL permits the use of lethal force in armed conflict
unless the law establishes an express exception. Those who reject the exis-
tence of an LRM obligation have argued largely along these lines.
On the other hand, the permission to kill in wartime is itself an exception
to a more fundamental rule prohibiting the taking of human life.136 As such,
the claimed duty to exercise LRM exists as an exception to an exception to
because he is defenseless and susceptible to capture but because killing him is unnecessary to prevent him
from posing future threats.” Haque, supra note 130, at 104. R
133. See supra note 19. R
134. DOD, Law of War Manual, supra note 3, at 58. R
135. See supra Section II.A.
136. See id.
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one of the most fundamental rules that there is.137 This structural aspect of
IHL suggests a second interpretive presumption, one that protects human
life by treating claimed justifications for killing with skepticism. This pre-
sumption supports a different sort of clear-statement rule: one demanding
clarity regarding the scope of the permission to kill in wartime.
There is no inherent contradiction between these two presumptions: the
law may demand clarity regarding both the permission to kill and claimed
exceptions to that permission. However, framing the issue in these terms
reveals that the debate over LRM is not simply a matter of searching for
specific exceptions in the law. It is also a matter of understanding the scope
of the special permission to kill in wartime.
From a normative perspective, the moral status of wartime killing
presents many puzzles. Why, for example, should the existence of armed
conflict trigger rules that are so less protective of human life than those that
normally prevail? And how can it be that IHL’s permission to kill, along
with its corresponding constraints, makes no distinction between unlawful
aggressors and their victims? Perhaps the IHL rules benefit from an underly-
ing moral foundation that justifies the use of lethal force in wartime. Or
perhaps, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, the rules of war have proceeded on
the basis of a “moral sociology”: the law accepts without justifying the his-
torical inevitability of war, and tries merely to preserve some dose of human-
ity by imposing limited restrictions that have a realistic chance of
acceptance by the warring parties themselves.138
In either event, the structure of IHL reflects an accommodation between
military prerogative and humanity.139 It accepts the functional requirements
of war. But it does with limitations. As I argue here, the express side con-
straints by which IHL restricts necessity are supplemented by two related
internal restrictions that are intrinsic to that principle and define its con-
tours. The first restriction is that military necessity incorporates a right rea-
son requirement. It does not permit the killing of combatants for any reason
whatsoever, but instead only in pursuit of military advantage. The second
restriction is objective in nature. Killing in wartime must advance some
anticipated military advantage.
The debate over LRM thus far has paid inadequate attention to the differ-
ence between these subjective and objective considerations. Analyzing them
137. See Jeremy Waldron, Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle?, in Targeted Killings:
Law And Morality In An Asymmetrical World 112, 113 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin &
Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (arguing that the rule permitting killing in wartime “represents a relaxation
of one of the most important norms we have—the norm against murder—and the justifications adduced
for [that rule] or for similar principles represent a significant modification of our usual way of arguing
about murder”).
138. Id. at 127.
139. Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving
the Delicate Balance, 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 795, 798 (2010) (“IHL represents a carefully thought out balance
between the principles of military necessity and humanity. Every one of its rules constitutes a dialectical
compromise between these two opposing forces.”).
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separately as they impact specific scenarios reveals areas of potential agree-
ment among the different sides of this debate as well as areas requiring
further examination. As I explain, both restrictions are compatible with the
broad formulations of military necessity that have prevailed in military tra-
dition. The practical effect of each restriction, however, is impacted by vari-
ous interpretive choices.
A. Insufficient Reason
Consider the following hypothetical cases:
1. In World War II, a German soldier crosses enemy lines under orders
to attempt a quiet nighttime capture, and he comes across a sleeping
American soldier. Upon spotting evidence that his sleeping opponent
is Jewish, the German soldier is overcome by hatred. He fires his
rifle, disobeying orders and threatening the mission.
2. A general in wartime discovers that a man suspected of killing his
brother before the war is a low-level combatant for the opposing side.
Angered that the suspect has escaped justice, the general orders a
successful targeted killing operation against him. The risky mission
has no appreciable anticipated military benefit, and it diverts impor-
tant resources from other critical missions.
3. A general receives word that a group of enemy troops has found itself
encircled, outnumbered, and practically defenseless. She initially or-
ders the transmission of a request for surrender (believing this can be
done safely and that intelligence purposes favor capture if possible).
She then substitutes an order to bomb after discovering that her mili-
tary does not wish to expend resources on keeping prisoners of war.
Notwithstanding important differences among these examples, I do not
believe that any of them find justification in military necessity. The problem
in each case is that the actor who exercises lethal force fails do so for the
reasons that are privileged by necessity and that have informed that princi-
ple’s historical development. At best, the target’s status as a lawful target
serves as pretext for killing otherwise motivated by unnecessary
considerations.
The centrality of reasons to the permission to kill in wartime is evident
both as a matter of basic logic and from the ways in which the necessity has
been historically formulated. Take for instance, the Lieber Code’s account,
which defines the principle generally as “the necessity of those measures
which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”140 The Code broadly
allows that “[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or
140. Lieber Code, supra note 43, art. 14. R
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limb of ‘armed’ enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is inciden-
tally ‘unavoidable’ in the armed contests of the war,”141 but it also qualifies
that definition with various provisos, including the limitation that
“[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wound-
ing except in fight.”142 As framed by Lieber, then, reasons play a central role
in defining military necessity. The principle privileges the killing of enemy
combatants for the purpose “of securing the ends of war,”143 but prohibits
the infliction of suffering “for the sake of suffering or for revenge.”144
A similar limitation inheres in the influential Hostages formulation which
provides that “[m]ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws
of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete sub-
mission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and
money.”145 So framed, military necessity confers broad authority to kill en-
emy combatants, but only for a specified purpose. Likewise, the 1868 Saint
Petersburg Declaration explains that “the only legitimate object which
States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy; [t]hat for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the
greatest possible number of men.”146
Considerations of right reason have been largely, albeit not entirely, ig-
nored in the LRM debate. Reasons receive no mention in the Pictet formula,
nor in the primary contemporary sources—the ICRC’s Interpretive Gui-
dance,147 Israel’s Targeted Killing case,148 and the Alston Report149—endors-
ing that formula. Goodman, by contrast, briefly notes the range of non-
141. Id. art. 15.
142. Id. art. 16. Article 16 further excludes “torture to extract confessions,” “the use of poison in any
way,” the “wanton devastation of a district,” “acts of perfidy,” and “in general . . . any act of hostility
which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”
143. Id. art. 14.
144. Id. art. 16.
145. United States v. List (The Hostages Case), XI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals 1230, 1253 (1948); see DOD, Law of War Manual, supra note 3, at 52 (“Military
necessity may be defined as the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy
as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”); see also 1914 Rules of
Land Warfare, supra note 47, ¶¶ 9–11 (“A belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any
kind of force which is necessary for the purpose of the war; that is, the complete submission of the enemy
at the earliest possible moment with the least expenditure of men and money. . . . Military necessity
justifies a resort to all the measures which are indispensable for securing this object and which are not
forbidden by the modern laws and customs of war.”); 1940 Rules of Land Warfare, supra note 47, ¶ R
4a (“A belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any kind of force to compel the complete
submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money.”); 1956 FM 27-10
(Change No. 1 1976), supra note 47, ¶ 3a (“That principle which justifies those measures not forbidden R
by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon
as possible.”).
146. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 88.
147. See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 18, at 82. R
148. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02, 57(6) PD 285
(2005) (Isr.).
149. See Alston Report, supra note 12. R
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military “factors that military and civilian authorities would be entitled to
take into account if states had unfettered discretion to kill enemy combat-
ants,” but he does not identify right reason as a distinct precondition of
necessity or otherwise devote much attention to the issue.150 LRM oppo-
nents, for their part, have also generally ignored the distinction between
subjective and objective advantage altogether, choosing instead to reject
LRM restraints in broader strokes.151
1. Cruelty, Hatred, and Revenge
One important exception in this respect is Jens Ohlin, who does acknowl-
edge the centrality of reason to Lieber’s prohibition on cruelty: he accepts
that “[a]s far as the general principle goes, what is outlawed by the principle
of necessity is death and destruction not related to the war effort—actions
performed purely out of cruelty, avarice, revenge, madness or nihilism, one
would suppose.”152 Yet he assigns the point no great significance because
“[a] rational actor has little reason to pursue such actions anyway, unless
overcome by emotion, since they are not related to the war effort.”153 Pre-
sumably then, Ohlin would agree that an LRM obligation applies in cases
like the first hypothetical, involving killing driven by anti-Semitic hatred.
One can imagine other grim reasons that might drive soldiers to kill in
contravention of military advantage, including hatred of the enemy, score
keeping among comrades, and the pursuit of trophies of war.154 One should
be careful, however, because in some cases it may be precisely these negative
emotions that enable individual soldiers to perform their lethal duties in
conformity with IHL. In the heat of battle, dehumanization of the enemy
may to some degree be a subjective precondition to the pursuit of military
advantage.155 I do not argue here that a combatant who carries out lawful
orders, but does so with evil thoughts, violates the law. Instead, my hypo-
thetical imagines that illicit reasons have overridden the pursuit of military
advantage, providing a decisive reason to kill.
150. Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 822. R
151. This is true, for example, both of W. Hays Parks’ oft cited rebuttal to the ICRC Interpretive
Guidance, see Parks, supra note 19, and of Corn et al.’s analysis which rejects Goodman’s position R
without addressing his questions concerning improperly motivated attack, see Corn et al., supra note 19, R
at 596.
152. Ohlin, supra note 11, at 1301. R
153. Id.
154. E.B. Sledge, With The Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa 120 (1981) (recalling the
practice of Marines in World War II of collecting gold teeth from dead Japanese soldiers and in one case,
a live but wounded soldier, and reflecting that “[s]uch was the incredible cruelty that decent men could
commit when reduced to a brutish existence in their fight for survival amid the violent death, terror,
tension, fatigue, and filth that was the infantryman’s war”).
155. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From Yamashita to
Blas˘kiæ and Beyond, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 638, 662 (2007) (noting that “military training and com-
mand structures are expressly designed to dissolve the social inhibitions that normally prevent people
from committing acts of extreme violence, and to remove their sense of moral agency when committing
such acts”).
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2. Avoiding Post-Capture Obligations
Ohlin might also agree that an LRM obligation applies in my second
hypothetical—involving the targeting of a suspected murderer—since it in-
volves killing for reasons of revenge rather than military advantage. Like my
first hypothetical, the example is rather farfetched, but it is instructive be-
cause it presents a rationale for killing—retributive justice—that is neither
related to the war effort nor a result of purely irrational impulses. Instead, it
raises the possibility that IHL could be invoked to pursue rational—even
desirable—objectives through impermissible means.
This second hypothetical has special salience for post-9/11 debates that
have navigated the border between the criminal law and IHL. For instance,
in his speech announcing the successful operation to kill Osama bin Laden,
President Obama appealed to values of criminal justice when he recalled the
crimes of 9/11 and proclaimed that, with bin Laden’s killing, “[j]ustice has
been done.”156 Likewise, one narrative dictates that the legal and political
controversy surrounding the detention and trial of detainees at Guantanamo
Bay and elsewhere spurred the United States to rely more heavily on
targeted killing as an alternative to detention and prosecution.157
Perhaps, one might argue, military necessity is permissive enough to rec-
ognize the advantage of avoiding trial and detention. After all, killing com-
batants provides a cheaper alternative, promoting the efficiency values
endorsed by the Hostages formulation. But reading the principle that broadly
creates irreconcilable tensions with the broader framework of IHL, and in
particular with the various protections that regulate detention and trial of
combatants post-capture. If post-capture savings cannot justify the killing of
hors de combat belligerents, why should they justify the killing of armed com-
batants? There is, of course, a material difference between those belligerents
who are hors de combat and those who are not—after all, it is only the latter
156. President Barack Obama, Osama Bin Laden Dead (May 2, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead.
157. Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War On Terror and the Soul of the Obama
Presidency 126–27 (2012) (noting with respect to the lethal 2009 raid in Somalia against Al Qaeda
leader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan that “[r]umors swirled through the Pentagon that Nabhan had been killed
because the White House didn’t want to face the tangled and politically fraught detention issues. Jeh C.
Johnson, the military’s top lawyer, was so concerned, he conducted his own inquiry to satisfy himself that
that was not the case. In the end, no direct evidence has ever emerged showing that the decision to
pursue a kill over a capture in the Nabhan case was dictated by the lack of a long-term detention policy.
Yet participants in the conference call that day realized that over time, the lack of a policy would
foreclose important tactical avenues in the war on terror. The inability to detain terror suspects was
creating perverse incentives that favored killing or releasing suspected terrorists over capturing them.
‘We never talked about this openly, but it was always a back-of-the-mind thing for us,’ recalled one of
Obama’s top counterterrorism advisers. ‘Anyone who says it wasn’t is not being straight.’”); see also
Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 823 (citing the same and asking, “Would a state be permit- R
ted to adopt a strategy that in effect prefers trying to kill rather than capture combatants because deten-
tion options are limited by domestic politics?”); Blum, supra note 52, at 162 (noting that “the military, R
political, and legal costs of holding enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay create a strong incentive to
kill rather than capture”).
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who are subject to attack. But that distinction lies most obviously in the
threat posed by armed combatants. As Gabriella Blum notes, “[t]he rules
about hors de combat all share one underlying principle: Once soldiers are
incapacitated—through surrender, capture, or injury—they no longer pose a
threat.”158
This distinction suggests a fairly straightforward division regarding the
scope of military necessity. The point of killing in wartime is to incapacitate
enemy fighters, and the principle of military necessity authorizes lethal
means for that purpose. But it does not authorize lethal force merely for the
purpose of avoiding the legal protections that IHL guarantees for those com-
batants who have already become incapacitated. Hence, on this account, my
third hypothetical, involving a general who denies an opportunity for sur-
render precisely for purposes of avoiding post-capture obligations, also lacks
support in military necessity.
Perhaps one might disagree with this conclusion and identify some reason
why avoidance of hors de combat status for one’s enemies is itself a legitimate
military objective, but at minimum, the point is not one that can be re-
solved merely by appealing to the summary account provided by common
formulations of military necessity. Instead, the necessity principle itself re-
quires more nuanced interpretation.
3. Morale
These examples also raise the question of what other reasons might lie
outside the necessity principle. Blum, for instance, questions whether a deci-
sion to kill rather than capture could be justified on the basis of “garnering
domestic support for the war or weakening the morale of the enemy.”159 In a
broad sense, such morale related considerations may advance the effective
prosecution of war, and might therefore be “necessary,” as Blum observes, in
the sense of being “convenient or beneficial.”160 She elaborates that
“whether we allow the killing of people because it has a positive effect on
domestic support or a negative effect on the enemy’s morale is ultimately a
normative judgment.”161 Indeed, I think there is evidence that modern IHL
already rejects killing for that purpose. To take one example, the propor-
tionality test demands that attacking forces weigh expected harm to civil-
ians and civilian objects against “the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”162 That language operates to exclude more indirect advantages
such as morale raising, yet if military necessity does privilege the use of
lethal force for those purposes, one would also expect that advantage to
count against civilian harms in the proportionality balance.
158. Id. at 126.
159. Id. at 142.
160. Id. (internal quotations omitted)
161. Id. at 142–43.
162. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b). R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 39  7-MAR-18 10:38
2018 / Targeted Capture 39
Imagine, for instance, a decision to kill rather than capture that is justi-
fied purely by reference to morale and that causes anticipated harm to civil-
ians. The attack would surely be an illegal, disproportionate attack on the
grounds of having no concrete and direct military advantage in comparison
to capture. Can one simultaneously conclude that the combatants themselves
were killed for a valid military reason?
Similarly, Additional Protocol I’s targeting rule defines military objec-
tives as “limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”163 While there is no corre-
sponding limitation on the targeting of combatants, the apparent explana-
tion for that omission is the idea that combatants, unlike inanimate
objectives, are presumed to make an “effective contribution to military ac-
tion,” and that their killing, almost as a per se matter, “offers a definite
military advantage” under “the circumstances ruling that time.”164 That
rationale supports, at best, the broad permission to kill combatants as a
means of incapacitation, but it fails to support the use of lethal force for
morale-related purposes in cases when the perceived military advantage oth-
erwise favors capture.
4. Diplomatic Relations
Goodman, in his own defense of LRM obligations, questions whether the
United States may invoke diplomatic relationships as a reason to choose kill-
ing over capture.165 The claim is an interesting one because it reveals some
of the grey area involved both in defining the permissible scope of military
reason and in assigning responsibility for actions that lack necessity.
One can imagine scenarios in which diplomatic concerns would present
clear-cut failures of necessity in the sense that I have been exploring. Sup-
pose that a target, if captured, will disclose embarrassing information about
government corruption that could threaten bilateral economic relations with
a third state for reasons that have nothing at all to do with the ongoing
armed conflict. Although killing the target will prevent the disclosure, that
non-military consideration cannot, in my view, inform a decision to use le-
thal force.
163. Id. art. 52(2).
164. Id. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 34, at 144–45 (justifying the killing of soldiers based on the R
dangers they pose as a class). This assumption has not gone unchallenged, however. See Blum, supra note
52, at 139 (summarizing philosophical critiques of a purely class-based permission to kill combatants R
and presenting additional “reasons to question whether modern warfare still warrants an interpretation of
the principle of military necessity as justifying the killing of as many combatants as possible”).
165. See Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 823 (“Would the government of Yemen, for R
example, be able to request the CIA to bomb the house of a known militant if local forces could easily
arrest him, but the government preferred to avoid the local political costs of holding him in long-term
detention?”).
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But arguments about diplomatic relations and U.S. targeted killing have
involved the more complex claim that the presence of U.S. troops on the
territory of certain states presents diplomatic complications that are avoided
by conducting drone strikes that allow no possibility of capture. For in-
stance, diplomatic sensitivities have at various times reportedly reduced the
feasibility of ground operations in Yemen.166
One reason why that scenario is more complicated is because the diplo-
matic issue may directly impact the very legality of a capture operation
under international law. A drone strike conducted in Yemen with the con-
sent of Yemen’s government will not violate jus ad bellum, but a ground
operation conducted without such consent might.167 Hence, the government
might argue, the drone strike offers the clear military advantage of being the
only legally permissible means of incapacitation.
The answer is not so straightforward, however, because it is not clear that
state consent should be allowed to restrict the operation of IHL in this way.
Consider, for example, how the denial of ground forces may also endanger
civilian lives by making the verification of targets more difficult and requir-
ing less discriminate means of attack. Is it also permissible for a state to
conduct strikes that are less protective of civilian lives than another method
that is entirely feasible and could be pursued with equal or more military
advantage but for the lack of state consent?168 A strong counterargument
dictates that states cannot rely on this type of constrained consent to justify
actions that would otherwise justify an IHL violation. Holding otherwise
effectively allows the territorial state to redefine jus in bello as it wishes sim-
ply by foreclosing more protective options. There is also a third possibility
according to which such actions violate IHL, but that responsibility for the
violation lies only with the territorial state, and not with the state con-
ducting the strike. Under any of these scenarios, however, the issue is not
really one of diplomatic relations. The real question concerns the interaction
166. See Klaidman, supra note 157, at 237 (noting in one case that “[a] capture operation in Yemen R
was not feasible because of the political backlash it would cause”); Scott Shane, Targeted Killing Comes to
Define War on Terror, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2013, at A1 (reporting that “according to experts on
counterterrorism inside and outside the government” the “policy on targeted killing” is shaped in part
by “the resistance of the authorities in Pakistan and Yemen to even brief incursions by American
troops”); David E. Sanger & Eric E. Schmitt, Yemenis Tell U.S. It Must Suspend Ground Missions, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 2017, at A1.
167. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 12, at 267 (arguing that “[a]lthough a self-defense rationale is R
ultimately the most defensible jus-ad-bellum justification for the breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity
occasioned by the Bin Laden operation, it is not unassailable. By contrast, consent provides an easy
answer to the question of the legality of the American incursion into Yemen.”).
168. In particular, Additional Protocol I requires that:
those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives [and] take all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(2)(a). R
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of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in situations where compliance with jus ad
bellum hinges on a limited state consent. And this question has broader im-
plications than the kill or capture debate.
For its part, the United States has never maintained that the legality of a
particular targeted killing has hinged on state consent. It asserts the broader
claim that international law permits it to conduct strikes in states that are
unwilling or unable to constrain the threat posed by armed groups such as
Al Qaeda that are operating in its territory.169 On this account, the concern
about diplomatic relations assumes a weaker form: the issue is not legality
per se, but the military advantage inherent in conducting operations in a
way that permits cooperation with the territorial state. But the central diffi-
culty remains the same, as the claim entails one state finding military ad-
vantage in respecting another state’s wish to limit the protections of IHL.
B. Insufficient Advantage
Apart from considerations regarding subjective motivation, a separate set
of questions concerns whether even properly motivated lethal force against
combatants may lack sufficient justification in military necessity because, as
an objective matter, capture presents a viable alternative. In principle, the
existence of some such limitation should be uncontroversial. The point of
the necessity principle is to privilege actions that advance military advan-
tage, and so it would seem obvious that that principle does not privilege the
use of force beyond what is necessary to pursue military advantage. Indeed,
as the DOD Law of War Manual observes, “[a]lthough military necessity jus-
tifies certain actions necessary to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently
as possible, military necessity cannot justify actions not necessary to achieve
this purpose.”170
1. Zero or Negative Advantage
At minimum, then, one would at least expect agreement on the point
that capture must be preferred to killing in cases where killing offers no
comparative military advantage whatsoever over less restrictive means. And
indeed, that is precisely the scenario that LRM advocates have focused on.
Consider the following examples:
1. The authorities find an unarmed terrorist sitting in a restaurant away
from active hostilities directing air strikes over a cell phone. He is
killed instantly.
169. See, e.g., Brennan Speech, supra note 13 (“Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al- R
Qa’ida, the United States takes the legal position that—in accordance with international law—we have
the authority to take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-
defense analysis each time. And as President Obama has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the
right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary
actions themselves.”).
170. DOD, Law of War Manual, supra note 3, art. 58. R
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2. A target is killed showering in his home, never aware that he was
surrounded by a special forces unit.
3. A terrorist suspect passes security in a European train station while en
route to the planned site of a terrorist attack. The police are about to
undertake what is, by all appearances, a routine and safe arrest, but
they receive information that the suspect has been designated an en-
emy combatant. Instead, they wait for a military unit to arrive and
kill the unsuspecting target.
The first example appears in the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Direct
Participation in Hostilities, as evidence why an LRM obligation exists in
cases where “there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”171
The second example is one of seven that Ryan Goodman invokes in support
of an LRM obligation.172 In all but two of his scenarios, Goodman hypothe-
sizes that there is no military advantage at all to capturing rather than kill-
ing the combatant.173 If one accepts that premise, it is difficult to see how
one can simultaneously justify lethal force based on military necessity. In-
deed, such cases are barely distinguishable from those involving improper
motive as the absence of any anticipated military advantage provides the
best evidence that an attack was not in fact motivated by military considera-
tions to begin with.
Oddly, those adopting the opposing position have generally declined to
engage the particular examples advanced by LRM proponents, and have fo-
cused instead on scenarios in which contemplation of LRM would impose
risks on combatants.174 Yet none have argued, to my knowledge, that com-
batants are affirmatively permitted to use force absent military necessity.
171. ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 18, at 81–82. The ICRC also invokes the IHL R
principle of humanity when it maintains that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adver-
sary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no
necessity for the use of lethal force.” Id. at 82. This principle finds its best known enunciation in the
Martens Clause which, pursuant to the version appearing in Additional Protocol I, provides that “[i]n
cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom,
from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” Additional Protocol I, supra
note 3, art. 1(2); see also Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land, supra note R
86, pmbl. (similar); Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land, supra note
87, pmbl. (similar). As Adil Haque notes, there is debate over whether or not the principle of humanity
is a rule with “independent legal status” or, instead, simply a principle to “inform the development,
interpretation, and application of specific rules of treaty or custom.” Haque, supra note 130, at 98 R
(2017). My own argument, however, does not turn on the outcome of this debate because a killing not
justified by military necessity will lack authorization by IHL in either event.
172. Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 821. R
173. See id. at 821–22.
174. For instance, Ohlin responds to the example in the ICRC Interpretive Guidance by noting
that “risking any number of lives in an attempt to capture offends [the necessity] principle as written,”
Ohlin, supra note 11, at 1300, but that response does not address the situation assumed by the Guidance, R
in which it is “possible to neutralize the military threat posed by that civilian through capture or other
non-lethal means without additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding civilian population,”
ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 18, at 81. R
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The general argument, instead, is that an LRM obligation is incompatible
with military necessity.
One reason for this alleged incompatibility lies in the breadth of the ne-
cessity principle that, pursuant to the Hostages formulation, permits “the
complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the
least expenditure of men and money.”175 As David Luban observes, a literal
reading of this language would seem to permit “any lawful act that saves a
dollar or a day in the pursuit of military victory.”176 Hence, it may be that
many uses of lethal force that appear to lack necessity do in fact pursue
necessity according to a proper understanding of that principle. It may be,
for instance, that the showering combatant has no chance against the special
forces unit that has entered his home, but that attempting capture neverthe-
less presents some risk of a physical altercation that could cause a small
delay. Attempting capture, therefore, will not advance the submission of
enemy “at the earliest possible moment” in the most literal sense of those
words.177
Yet even this broadest interpretation leaves open the possibility that some
cases will still present failures of necessity. It may be, for instance, that
lethal force carries its own risks—ranging from the equally trivial to the
more substantial—that are sufficient to equalize or outweigh the considera-
tions opposing capture. Hence, even the broadest reading of necessity will
operate merely to narrow, rather than eliminate, the scenarios in which kill-
ing offers no comparative advantage compared to capture.
2. De Minimis or Trivial Advantage
There are, moreover, compelling reasons to avoid the most extreme inter-
pretation of military necessity. As a textual matter, even the broad Hostages
formulation leaves room for interpretation, as its permissive but general lan-
guage does not explicitly address the matter of trivial or de minimis military
advantage. A plausible interpretation—one consistent with the basic inter-
national rule demanding that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”178—dictates that
the necessity principle endorses the pursuit of cognizable military advantage
that meets some de minimis threshold of significance.
Other rules of IHL support this view both directly and indirectly. Perhaps
most significant is Additional Protocol I’s regulation of “superfluous in-
175. United States v. List (The Hostages Case), XI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals 1230, 1253–54 (1948).
176. See David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 315,
342 (2013).
177. Id.
178. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 125, art. 31.
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jury” and “unnecessary suffering.”179 As I have already explored, that lan-
guage presupposes that combatants can make reasonable judgments about
when the infliction of injury and suffering become militarily unnecessary.180
Yet if the necessity principle has no de minimis threshold, then Article 35(2)
becomes largely a dead letter, permitting even the use of arms such as ex-
ploding bullets that are acknowledged to fall within the core of the
prohibition.181
Less direct, analogical support exists within the rule protecting combat-
ants who are hors de combat pursuant to Article 41. My point here is not that
an unenumerated LRM protection can be identified simply by process of
analogy from the existing hors de combat protection. Rather, my analogy rests
on how the hors de combat protection itself requires similar interpretive work
beyond what the bare text itself provides. The law demands, for instance,
that a combatant’s immunity from attack will depend on whether that com-
batant has “clearly express[ed] an intention to surrender,” but Additional
Protocol I does not specify what level of certainty is required to know that
the surrender is genuine, nor does it specifically address cases in which sur-
render is impossible to effectuate, no matter how clearly expressed the inten-
tion may be.182 An interpretation demanding absolute certainty in the face
of even trivial or barely cognizable risk would likewise nullify the operation
of this provision as well.
Notably, the United States has put its own gloss on this language. In
defending the killing of Osama bin Laden, the U.S. State Department’s then
Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, explained that “consistent with the laws of
armed conflict and U.S. military doctrine, the U.S. forces were prepared to
capture bin Laden if he had surrendered in a way that they could safely
accept.”183 By emphasizing the importance of a safe surrender, this language
gives more explicit priority to considerations of military necessity than does
the bare text of Additional Protocol I. Nevertheless, it too falls short of
complete clarity because it fails to specify either the degree of safety required
or the level of certainty concerning that degree of safety. If safety means zero
risk of any harm whatsoever, then the safety requirement would swallow the
hors de combat rule: after all, there is always a risk the capturing soldier might
receive a scratch or catch a cold from the surrendering combatant. But
clearly that is not what a safe surrender means: implicit in the safety require-
ment is some threshold of significance regarding the risk and level of
threatened harm.
It is a similar process of reasoning that identifies some threshold of signif-
icance within the principle of military necessity itself: the point of killing in
179. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 35(2). R
180. See supra Section II.A.3.
181. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text.
182. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 41(2). R
183. Koh, supra note 6. R
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wartime is to advance legitimate military purposes. The permission to kill is
broad, but it implies the pursuit of some cognizable, non-trivial military
goal.
There are, in addition, two more, indirect arguments supporting the view
that the permissibility of killing in wartime is restrained by some threshold
of significant advantage. The first of these is a point already made with
respect to attacks offering zero or negative advantage. Just as the objective
absence of military advantage provides good evidence that an attack was not,
in fact, undertaken for subjectively permissible reasons, so too does the ab-
sence of any significant military advantage.
The second point is that the prohibition against disproportionate attacks
will often operate to prohibit lethal force unsupported by significant mili-
tary advantage. That rule forbids as indiscriminate “[a]n attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, dam-
age to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”184
Application of this standard presents complexities, and the difficulty of de-
termining when civilian losses outweigh anticipated military advantage has
led to a legal status quo highly deferential toward military prerogative.185 It
is noteworthy, for instance, that the now voluminous case law of interna-
tional criminal tribunals reveals barely a single war crimes conviction based
on a finding that an attack directed against a military objective lacked suffi-
cient anticipated military advantage in comparison to the expected harm to
civilians.186
Nevertheless, recognition of these difficulties has not precluded acknowl-
edgement that clear cases will present straightforward proportionality viola-
tions.187 And attacks undertaken for little or no military benefit are precisely
184. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5). R
185. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
186. Ohlin and May give one example. See Ohlin & May, supra note 59, at 117 & n.82 (citing the
case of Prosecutor v. Prlic` while also noting that “violations of proportionality (by killing too many civil-
ians to achieve a military result) are almost never prosecuted”). In Prosecutor v. Prlic`, Case No. IT-04-74-
T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), a Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ruled that the destruction of the historic Old
Bridge in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina reflected an attack on a military objective that caused dispropor-
tionate harm to the civilian population in light of the resulting “serious deterioration of the humanita-
rian situation” and the “very significant psychological impact on the Muslim population.” Id. ¶ 1583.
The Court, however, also emphasized the bridge’s “immense cultural, historical, and symbolic value,”
and found that “the HVO command intended to destroy the Old Bridge of Mostar, thereby sapping the
morale of the Muslim population of Mostar.” Id. ¶ 1586. Perhaps, then, the Court’s ruling on propor-
tionality was informed by its sense that the bridge was not targeted for its military value in the first
place. An appeal of the judgment is currently pending. Another trial judgment at the same tribunal also
convicted the accused in part based on their participation in allegedly disproportionate attacks. See Prose-
cutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
15, 2011). However, that judgment was reversed on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-
90-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Nov. 16, 2012).
187. See Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 50 (June 13,
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the kind most likely to present such a clear case. For instance, in cases where
capture presents a safe and feasible option, almost any risk to civilian life
resulting from lethal force becomes unjustifiable. Indeed, if the anticipated
military advantage of a lethal attack is zero or negative as compared to non-
lethal options, then even minor damage to inanimate civilian objects—such
as a window broken by a bullet—is disproportionate. Of course, the prohib-
ited harm under this rule is only the incidental injury to civilians and civil-
ian objects, and so an attack that is unlawful merely because of relatively
minor harm to a non-living object does not compare in terms of gravity to
one that involves the unlawful taking of a combatant’s life. Nevertheless,
these proportionality considerations provide an additional reason to conclude
that—in many cases—lethal force undertaken with only a minimal expecta-
tion of military advantage will lack legal justification.
3. Risk and Inconvenience
A more difficult question concerns situations where LRM obligations ap-
ply to captures that are in some sense feasible but only at the expense of a
more significant advantage. The ICRC’s Commentary to Article 35(1) of
Additional Protocol I suggests such a path by casting doubt on the Hostages
formulation of military necessity. It objects that this formulation “has the
disadvantage that it does not in fact take into account the paragraph of
Article 35 with which we are concerned, and therefore it cannot stand on its
own.”188 “Moreover,” the Commentary continues, “it should be quite clear
that the requirement as to minimum loss of life and objects which is in-
cluded in this definition refers not only to the assailant, but also to the party
attacked. If this were not the case, the description would be completely
inadequate.”189
The implications of these observations are not entirely straightforward,
and it is worth considering each statement in turn. Article 35(1) provides
that “[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”190 The Commentary’s
reliance on this article raises a similar question to the one I have previously
explored with respect to Article 35(2)’s regulation of superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering.191 Does this provision restrict the scope of necessity,
or does it instead merely affirm the more general point that the use of force
in wartime is subject to certain restrictions? How exactly Article 35(1) nar-
rows the broad necessity principle is a question the Commentary leaves
largely unexplored.
2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf (observing that “there will be many cases where
reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian
objects was clearly disproportionate to the military advantage gained”).
188. ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1397. R
189. Id.
190. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 35(1). R
191. See supra Section II.A.3.
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The Commentary’s second point—favoring an obligation to minimize the
loss of combatant lives on both sides of the conflict—is more provocative, as
it could be read to suggest that combatants must sometimes risk their own
lives in order to save those of their opponents.192 But the Commentary does
not acknowledge or answer the critical underlying question of how one bal-
ances the value of enemy combatant lives against either the lives of one’s
own soldiers or against considerations relating to time and resources. De-
pending on how one orders these values, the Commentary’s interpretation of
necessity may be consistent with the one that I have defended: the obliga-
tion to minimize combatant lives may simply take the form of a prohibition
on attacks that do not pursue a cognizable military advantage.
Alternately, one might hold that combatants must assign the same value
to their opponents’ lives as to their own, but this view is hard to imagine
gaining acceptance among states and is one that poses perplexing implemen-
tation problems for a field of law premised on the assumption that war is
waged primarily through the killing of enemy combatants. Is it necessary,
for instance, that a military sacrifice its own soldiers’ lives merely to achieve
a military advantage in a way that spares a greater aggregate number of
enemy combatant lives? Or perhaps one might adopt an intermediate ap-
proach that avoids this result but nevertheless maintains that the preserva-
tion of enemy lives demands some reasonable expenditure of time and
expense that could otherwise be avoided by lethal force. Goodman, for in-
stance, suggests that LRM obligations may apply even when capture
presents some inconvenience, such as delaying the work of a military unit
that otherwise is not pressed for time, although he avoids taking a firm
position on this point.193
In part, such examples merely reinforce the importance of line drawing. If
the pursuit of military advantage is subject to a de minimis threshold, then
inevitably there will be controversy in some cases as to what exactly qualifies
as a military advantage and as to whether the threshold has been crossed.
More deeply, the difficulty with such proposals has to do with the central
structural feature of IHL that I have already identified: in wartime, the norm
against killing is relaxed in order to privilege the pursuit of military advan-
tage. While specific restrictions within IHL limit the pursuit of such advan-
192. The Commentary advances a similar claim with respect to the proportionality test itself when it
observes that the “rule of proportionality also applies with regard to the combatants, up to a point. The
deliberate and pointless extermination of the defending enemy constitutes disproportionate damage as
compared with the concrete and direct advantage that the attacker has the right to achieve.” ICRC
Commentary to Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, ¶ 1598. R
193. See Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 823 (“Properly conceived, the rule may require R
that the risk to attacking forces involve a ‘definite military advantage’ rather than just military inconve-
nience. And, in Section 3, I assess the evidence that a form of proportionality analysis might also apply.
Those features, however, are secondary considerations about the precise formulation of the rule. A thresh-
old question in current debates is whether LOAC prohibits the use of lethal force when it is manifestly
unnecessary to kill an individual rather than injure or capture them, that is, when killing is unnecessary
to accomplish a military objective or to avoid harm to the attacking forces.”).
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tage in defined scenarios, the internal logic of IHL does not itself provide
criteria for limiting military necessity in ways that are stricter than what I
have proposed but nevertheless more permissive than the peacetime rules.
My own identification of an LRM requirement rests on the claim that lethal
force unaccompanied by a proper reason or by some cognizable advantage
does not pursue military necessity at all. Proposals for a more robust LRM
requirement may have normative weight, but become more difficult to de-
fend without alteration to existing legal principles.
IV. Counterarguments and Scope
So far, I have argued that IHL supports a duty to capture rather than kill
combatants in two circumstances not otherwise covered by the hors de combat
protections or other explicit constraints on necessity. First, killing is imper-
missible when the decision to kill (or to choose killing over capture) is not
motivated by considerations of military advantage. In connection with this
claim, I have further argued that the post-capture costs associated with de-
tention do not provide a valid justification for killing under IHL. Second, I
have argued that the decision to kill rather than capture must be justified by
some cognizable expectation of military advantage. In this Part, I test those
claims against two types of counterarguments. One, commonly advanced by
LRM opponents, dictates that an LRM obligation would be impracticable,
unjustifiably hobbling the pursuit of military advantage. The other counter-
argument, perhaps attractive to those who favor greater restraint on the use
of military force, objects that the restrictions I identify are too insignificant
to have practical effect.
A. Impracticability
Objections based on impracticability operate at various levels of general-
ity. Beginning at the micro level, there is the concern that combatants will
have trouble correctly assessing the threat posed by enemy combatants. Ar-
guing along these lines, Hays Parks levels substantial skepticism at Pictet’s
“use-of-force continuum.” For Hays Parks, the problem with Pictet’s em-
brace of LRM—and with the section of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance
that relies on it—is that it presents unreasonable expectations to the solider
facing split-second life and death decisions without the luxury of knowing
whether a single shot to wound will be adequate to neutralize a dangerous
opponent.194 Although Hays Parks levels his most blistering critique at the
idea that soldiers should shoot to wound rather than kill, his point applies
equally to decisions to attempt capture rather than inflict injury or death.195
194. Parks, supra note 19, at 814–15. The “reasonableness” issue and the critical factor of a split- R
second decision is not considered in Section IX of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance.
195. Id.
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It is not clear, however, why these concerns should preclude rather than
inform an LRM requirement. Properly understood, these arguments appeal
to considerations of military necessity to explain why, in many combat situ-
ations, consideration of nonlethal alternatives will prove infeasible. But they
do not explain why an LRM requirement should not apply in those cases
where lethal force lacks support in military necessity or even contravenes
military necessity. The appropriate response is to interpret and apply the
standard in a way that accommodates Hays Park’s concerns by giving sub-
stantial leeway to combatants facing the uncertainties and split-second judg-
ments endemic to the battlefield. Another way to accommodate these
concerns is to impose strict mens rea standards, declining to hold individu-
als liable for unnecessary killing unless they do so purposefully based on
actual knowledge of the circumstances rendering the use of lethal force
unnecessary.196
At a broader level of generality, however, even such a solution may fail to
allay systemic concerns about the impact of an LRM requirement. For Corn
et al., the central concern is that the very introduction of an LRM require-
ment into the rules of engagement, with the accompanying obligation to
train soldiers in its application, will itself hamstring the conduct of war.197
Pursuant to this line of argument, even a narrowly framed obligation will
burden the mental process of the individual combatant, leading to uncer-
tainty and hesitation in situations that cannot afford indecision. As an exam-
ple, they cite the case of a U.S. soldier fighting in Panama in 1989 who,
having switched abruptly from the peacetime engagement rules followed
during previous months’ deployment in Panama to the new wartime en-
gagement rules, found himself unable to navigate the transition.198
Taking things a step further, one could object that my interpretation of
military necessity operates to prohibit even the routine use of force on the
battlefield. After all, the war effort will rarely depend on whether any partic-
ular combatant lives or dies, and in many cases, it will be implausible to
maintain that the killing of a particular enemy combatant—viewed in isola-
tion—results in a military advantage of any significance. Yet the military
that refuses to kill anyone would, in most armed conflicts, fail to get very far
at all.
These examples operate to remind us that necessity works at the collective
level in addition to the individual level. The ultimate purpose of killing in
wartime is not to neutralize isolated, individual combatants, but to prevail
196. See Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 829 (“For example, criminal liability may apply R
(if it applies at all) only if an individual purposefully resorts to excess force.”).
197. Corn et al., supra note 19, at 567–68 (“[O]nce the law requires that soldiers assess the actual R
threat an enemy combatant poses, the inevitable consequence of a rule that requires least harmful means
based on the absence of an actual threat, the effectiveness of combat capability risks dilution and tactical
clarity will be degraded.”).
198. Id. at 568 n.87.
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in the armed conflict.199 What may seem appropriate and costless at the
individual level may look very different in the aggregate. Implementation of
an LRM obligation must, therefore, take account of the collective
consequences.
Yet even, here, it remains perplexing why the appropriate legal response
should be rejection rather than adaptation of an LRM requirement. Properly
understood, these arguments explain why the principle of military necessity
discourages or precludes consideration of LRM in many circumstances. They
may also explain why IHL does not—at least in so many words—regulate
the killing of combatants with an express LRM requirement: historically
speaking, the functional requirements of the battlefield have deterred con-
sideration of LRM. Hence there was no need to make explicit a limitation on
necessity that did not generally arise on the battlefield and thus did not
present the same concern for policy makers as did, say, the development of
exploding bullets, chemical weapons, and other inhumane technological in-
novations.200 (Yet neither do Additional Protocol I nor its predecessors make
explicit the opposite assumption—apparently embraced by LRM oppo-
nents201—that military necessity always permits the status-based killing of
belligerents for any reason and under any circumstance unless an explicit
restriction applies.) But this explanation does not speak to cases that do not
involve these practical considerations.
For example, the argument that an LRM requirement would impede the
pursuit of military necessity does nothing to justify killings not pursued for
reasons of military necessity in the first instance.202 Hence, the requirement
of right reason survives the appeal to practical necessity, as does the accom-
panying need to distinguish between those reasons that are privileged by
military necessity and those that are not. In addition, it is not clear why the
concern about collective effect may not also be met by appropriate interpre-
tation of necessity. An LRM obligation may introduce some uncertainty into
combat operations, but if the obligation is limited to the clearest cases, the
impact on military judgment would seem relatively minor in comparison to
undisputed requirements such as the obligation to distinguish between ci-
vilian and military targets, the proportionality rule, and the protections af-
199. Corn et al., supra note 19, at 565 (“[T]he objective of all military action in armed conflict is R
achieving enemy submission in the collective sense.”).
200. At the same time, neither API nor its predecessors explicitly set forth the opposite rule—de-
fended by LRM opponents—that status-based killing of belligerents is always permitted for any reason
and under circumstance unless an explicit restriction appears.
201. The Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual asserts that neither “customary international
law [nor] treaty law applicable to DoD personnel,” supports the position of “some commentators . . .
that military necessity should be interpreted so as to permit only what is actually necessary in the prevailing
circumstances, such as by requiring commanders, if possible, to seek to capture or wound enemy combat-
ants rather than to make them the object of attack,” but the Manual cites no legal authority expressly
stating the opposite. DOD Law of War Manual, supra note 3, at 57 (emphasis in original). R
202. See supra Section III.A.
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forded by hors de combat status, all of which may demand split second
judgments.203
More broadly, however, the appeal to practical necessity operates to a
large extent as a straw man argument because it focuses on scenarios that are
not contested by many proponents of an LRM standard. For instance, the
ICRC Interpretive Guidance on civilians directly participating in hostilities
openly acknowledges that LRM obligations are generally not suited to the
traditional battlefield. The Guidance concedes that “[i]n classic large-scale
confrontations between well-equipped and organized armed forces or
groups, the principles of military necessity and of humanity are unlikely to
restrict the use of force against legitimate military targets beyond what is
already required by specific provisions of IHL.”204 Recent efforts to identify
an LRM requirement within IHL emerge not from an impulse to impose
fundamental changes on the conduct of warfare but instead from concerns
about the rote application of battlefield understandings to conflicts whose
functional requirements differ markedly from the scenarios that inspired the
IHL rules in the first place. The practice of targeted killing, in particular,
presents a scenario in which states have invoked the IHL rules to justify
lethal operations planned and conducted against a single individual who
may or may not be located in or near an area of active combat. Indeed, as
Gabriela Blum has noted, the modern battlefield has complicated the dis-
tinction between combatants and civilians to a degree that “[m]ore nuanced
targeting decisions already require a substantial investment at the stage of
application, limiting the advantage of the current rule-like doctrines over a
more complex standard that would place further limits on the targeting of
combatants.”205 My point here is not that the IHL rules cannot apply to
such situations, but instead that the principle of military necessity will not
always apply in the same way to such operations as it does to more conven-
tional engagements.
Arguing along these lines, the ICRC Guidance emphasizes that:
The practical importance of [the] restraining function [imposed
by the principles of military necessity and humanity] will increase
with the ability of a party to the conflict to control the circum-
stances and area in which its military operations are conducted,
and may become decisive where armed forces operate against se-
lected individuals in situations comparable to peacetime policing.
In practice, such considerations are likely to become particularly
relevant where a party to the conflict exercises effective territorial
control, most notably in occupied territories and non-interna-
tional armed conflicts.206
203. See supra Part II.
204. ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 18, at 80. R
205. Blum, supra note 52, at 151. R
206. ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 18, at 80–81. R
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The Guidance illustrates the point with a hypothetical example I have
already mentioned: it imagines an “unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant”
who engages in hostilities—and thus becomes a military target—by “using
a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an
attacking air force.”207 Should the target do so “within an area firmly con-
trolled by the opposing party, however, it may be possible to neutralize the
military threat posed by that civilian through capture or other non-lethal
means without additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding
civilian population.”208 The power of this example lies in how it presents
the application of IHL to scenarios whose functional requirements have little
to do with the battlefield modalities that have historically driven the laws of
war. Of course, there may always be some risk accompanying a legal duty to
capture even in circumstances such as these, but it becomes harder to ex-
plain that risk by reference to military necessity. Notwithstanding the tar-
get’s hostile status, the scenario is functionally closer to the kind of threat
faced by law enforcement officials in peacetime who are more restricted in
their use of force than are combatants on the battlefield.209
Notably, Hays Parks does not claim that practical considerations demand
rejecting an LRM requirement in cases like these. He acknowledges that
“[t]here have been, and no doubt in future armed conflicts will be, situa-
tions such as those described in . . . the ICRC text,” but he concludes that
“other than the law of war prohibitions on perfidy and denial of quarter,
governments and courts have seen the prudence in declining to draw such a
line owing to the many vagaries that exist not only in domestic law enforce-
ment situations but also, and in particular, on the battlefield.”210 Hence,
Hays Parks’ principal objection to LRM in such scenarios is that it lacks
support in positive law. As I have argued, however, the better interpretation
of IHL is that it does not authorize the use of lethal force in cases where the
justification for killing over capture offers no military advantage beyond
some de minimis threshold.211
There still remains the concern that the very introduction of an LRM
requirement will inevitably have a negative spillover effect by complicating
the rules of engagement in other situations that cannot afford consideration
of less restrictive means.212 There are several reasons to doubt the inevitabil-
ity of that result. In the first place, there is no question that the military is
207. Id. at 81.
208. Id. Note that this statement does not directly reference the specific example I have quoted, but
instead refers to the ICRC’s more general statement that “while operating forces can hardly be required
to take additional risks . . . in order to capture an armed adversary alive, it would defy basic notions of
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where
there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.” Id. at 82.
209. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (summarizing peacetime rules). R
210. Parks, supra note 20, at 809–10.
211. See supra Section III.B.
212. See Corn et al., supra note 19, at 568 n.87 (arguing that “[s]oldiers cannot simply ‘shift’ from one R
use of force framework to another with ease”).
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capable of implementing an LRM standard in cases where capture is per-
ceived to offer greater military advantage than killing. This a point that
both Hays Parks and other LRM opponents acknowledge. It also finds ex-
pression in recent U.S. policy dictating that “[t]he policy of the United
States is not to use lethal force when it is feasible to capture a terrorist
suspect, because capturing a terrorist offers the best opportunity to gather
meaningful intelligence and to mitigate and disrupt terrorist plots.”213 Im-
plementing such a policy necessarily impacts the rules of engagement in
particular operations: special forces embarking on an operation to capture an
individual terrorist for intelligence purposes will necessarily follow different
rules of engagement than will combatants facing anonymous opponents on a
traditional battlefield.
The objection based on spillover effects embraces the mistaken assump-
tion that implementing such a duty necessarily entails across-the-board
adaption of the rules of engagement, such that every individual combatant
must remain sensitive to the possibility of capture in every situation. But as
the ICRC Guidance itself suggests, the choice is not a binary one between an
across-the-board LRM obligation and no such standard at all.214 The law
might instead acknowledge that broad swathes of combat activity simply do
not afford consideration of capture.
As others have observed, one way to implement the obligation is to assign
primary responsibility for its implementation to commanding officers.215
Along these lines, the law might also embrace a broad presumption that
instructions on LRM are not appropriate for most combat operations. Indi-
vidual soldiers would not in most instances follow rules of engagement re-
quiring consideration of LRM and individuals acting pursuant to such a rule
would not be held responsible for failing to consider LRM.
As these reflections reveal, the central question is not whether an obliga-
tion to consider LRM can be reconciled with the principle of military neces-
sity. The central question is how it should be. And answering that question
does not presuppose the type of wholesale alteration to the conduct of war
that critics have feared.
213. Obama, NDU Speech, supra note 24.
214. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
215. See Frits Kalshoven, The Soldier and His Golf Clubs, in Studies and Essays on International
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles, in Honour of Jean Pictet 385 (C. Swinarski, ed.,
1984) (exploring some practical obstacles to implementing the Pictet formula at the level of the individ-
ual solider, while also concluding that “taken less literally, Pictet’s argument appears to carry full
weight; that is, if it is understood as addressed to the authorities who decide on the armament of the
armed forces and, even, the military commanders who do have a choice of weapons at their disposal.”);
Goodman, Kill or Capture, supra note 18, at 829 (“The rule may be devised such that top-level com- R
manders are held to a higher standard of care. That is, only those actors may be liable for reckless or
grossly negligent behaviour.”).
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B. Unenforceability
I turn now to a second line of objection: that my framework involves too
great a concession to military necessity. While it may be possible to identify
hypothetical situations in which the deployment of lethal force against a
combatant lacks justification in military necessity, in real life it will almost
always be possible to identify some concrete reason why the pursuit of mili-
tary advantage advocated that course, especially when judged against the
broad definition of necessity that prevails in military tradition.
To some degree, this critique gives voice to what is in fact a central claim
of this Article. One can identify a duty to avoid unnecessary killing, but
doing so does not itself resolve the question of when that duty is triggered,
or how much weight that duty carries against claims of necessity. I have
argued that existing law best supports such a duty where there is an absence
of necessity resulting from the pursuit of non-military reasons or insignifi-
cant military advantage. It is the broad understanding of necessity that has
prevailed in military tradition that will justify a decision to kill rather than
capture in all but a small fraction of cases governed by IHL.
In addition, the claimed LRM obligation would hardly be alone among
IHL obligations in proving resistant to enforcement. Take for instance, the
principle of proportionality.216 An oft-cited report by prosecutors at the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia allowed that certain
scenarios would present demonstrable violations, such as “bombing a refu-
gee camp . . . if its only military significance is that people in the camp are
knitting socks for soldiers.”217 But it cautioned that
[M]ost applications of the principle of proportionality are not
quite so clear cut. It is much easier to formulate the principle of
proportionality in general terms than it is to apply it to a particu-
lar set of circumstances because the comparison is often between
unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess the value of
innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular mili-
tary objective.218
As I have already mentioned, the case law of international criminal tribunals
reflects almost no enforcement of this principle.219
At the same time, the enforcement of IHL has not relied exclusively or
even primarily on judicial application. Instead, the protections of IHL have
relied on other mechanisms, including internalization by states and various
forms of public accountability. In the context of drone strikes, civilian casu-
216. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b); see also text accompanying note 184. R
217. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Estab-
lished to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ¶ 48 (2000), http://
www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf.
218. See id.
219. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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alties have been a constant focus of attention both inside and outside the
government, affirming that proportionality-based concerns remain an im-
portant restraint, even when not judicially enforced.220 Likewise, while the
U.S. government has emphasized considerations of military advantage to
justify its stated policy of preferring capture over killing, the decision to
publicize that approach as general policy may also reflect a tacit recognition
that there are limits to the reach of necessity in these circumstances.221
Finally, LRM obligations do not exist in isolation, and their importance
will typically reveal itself in combination with other, more clearly estab-
lished, IHL restraints. Consider an operation like the one that took the life
of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Reports indicate that the U.S.
government faced a preliminary decision about whether to target bin
Laden’s compound with a drone strike or instead, as President Obama ulti-
mately ordered, to deploy special forces to the scene.222 Adopting the first
option would have rendered capture impossible, yet this is not the type of
kill-or-capture decision that is likely to be constrained by the LRM obliga-
tion I have outlined. There are, instead, various considerations of military
advantage that could privilege an aerial strike, including the protection of
forces who would otherwise conduct the ground operation. So far as military
advantage is concerned, this is the type of decision appropriately left to mili-
tary discretion pursuant to the necessity principle.
This is not to say, however, that the choice between an aerial strike and a
ground operation is unregulated by law. The more relevant prohibition is
the proportionality rule’s protection of civilian life.223 One powerful argu-
ment dictates that the marginal military advantage achieved by protecting
one’s own forces may never outweigh an even greater risk to civilian lives
that could be avoided through a different choice of means.224 Accounts of
the bin Laden operation indicate that apprehension about civilian casualties
was indeed a major factor in the ultimate decision to pursue a ground opera-
tion.225 Depending upon how the respective risks to civilian and combatant
lives were assessed, the law of proportionality may in fact have demanded
this choice.
220. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, U.S. Reveals Death Toll from Airstrikes Outside War Zones,
N.Y. Times, July 2, 2016, at A1 (noting inter alia that “President Obama issued an executive order
making civilian protection a priority and requiring the government in the future to disclose the number
of civilian deaths each year”); Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan, New Yorker,
Nov. 24, 2014, at 98, 100 (noting that “researchers found that C.I.A.-operated drones were nowhere near
as discriminating toward noncombatants as the agency’s leaders have claimed,” but also that “drones
have probably spared more civilians than American jets have in past air wars,” and that “over time, the
Administration’s record improved significantly in avoiding civilian casualties”).
221. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. R
222. See, e.g., Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, New Yorker, Aug. 8, 2011, at 34, 35–36
(recounting the mission and its planning).
223. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b). R
224. See David J. Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in Reading Walzer 38 (Itzhak Benbaji &
Naomi Sussman eds., 2014).
225. See, e.g., Schmidle, supra note 222, at 10.
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The LRM obligation assumes greater relevance once a decision has been
made to undertake the kind operation that is conducive to capture. I do not
argue here that that particular operation necessarily triggered such an obli-
gation, or much less that, on this basis, the killing of bin Laden lacked
authorization under international law. Any such assessment would necessa-
rily hinge on a more detailed factual assessment than I can attempt here or
that may be possible given the established facts that are publicly available.
My argument instead is focused on the more general point that the kind of
operation at issue—one targeted against a residential compound in a subur-
ban neighborhood many miles away from an active combat zone226—is the
sort that could, under the right circumstances, give life to the type of LRM
requirement that I have posited, in which targeted capture might involve no
sacrifice of anticipated military advantage as compared to targeted killing.
Moreover, as I have suggested, the very feasibility of capture may be a result
of particular tactical choices that are themselves dictated by other legal obli-
gations, most notably the obligation to avoid disproportionate attacks.
Conclusion
In the conduct of war, is there a legal duty to prefer capture over killing?
I have argued that there is. I have also argued that the issue is less binary
than that question might assume, and that the distance between opposing
positions may be smaller than imagined.
This duty to capture, such as it is, lies along a central fault line forged by
the principle of military necessity. While there is a tendency among some to
see necessity as the principle authorizing purely status-based killing in the
absence of any explicit exception, that is not what that principle provides.
At minimum, necessity demands that wartime killing pursue military ad-
vantage. That is the sole basis upon which the laws governing warfare carve
out their remarkable exception to the deeply embedded norm against mur-
der. Two distinct limitations are embedded in that demand. The resort to
lethal force requires both a military reason and an actual expectation of mili-
tary advantage.
As I have explored, the permission is a broad one. Indeed, in the regular
conduct of hostilities, the pursuit of military advantage will usually pre-
clude consideration of LRM. That is a point that serious defenders of the
LRM obligation commonly acknowledge. But that acknowledgment is
hardly grounds to deny the very existence of an LRM obligation, or to as-
sume that the functional requirements of the traditional battlefield apply
unaltered to all contexts in which in which states today pursue military
necessity. The debate over LRM obligations is not new, but its recent
226. Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 11, at 352 (“In this case, the location where the killing took place R
(Abbottabad) is not only situated outside a reasonable ‘spillover’ area (about 160 kilometres away from
the Afghan border), but also outside the actual Pakistan battle zone.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\59-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 57  7-MAR-18 10:38
2018 / Targeted Capture 57
reemergence reflects the changing nature of warfare in the twenty-first cen-
tury, and underscores the ways in which new modalities demand vigilance to
ensure adherence to the fundamental principles that have long underpinned
the legal regulation—and indeed the moral justification—of warfare.
